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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper advocates introducing cybercrime legislation in Lesotho. Cybercrime is the 
hottest issue today. Cybercriminals can commit various illegal activities in cyberspace 
that few people even know exist. A nightmare scenario would be a hacker breaking 
into the hospital’s computer systems on a fine morning and before doctors can arrive 
to treat their patients, the malicious hacker modifies patients’ files on the hospital’s 
database systems: 
 
[S]urgeries slated to be performed on the right leg are now switched to the left leg; recorded 
blood types are altered from AB-negative to O-positive; warnings for known allergies to 
medicines such as penicillin are electronically erased from patients’ charts; and laboratory 
records on HIV blood tests results are insidiously switched from negative to positive just 
before patients are to receive their results. (Marc D Goodman ‘Why the police don’t care 
about computer crime’ (1997) 10 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 465 at 466). 
 
Although this scenario is possible with current technology, unfortunately Lesotho 
would be powerless to act for lack of adequate laws to investigate and prosecute this 
conduct. Lesotho’s current criminal laws can hardly be enforced against cybercrime, 
as they do not clearly prohibit the crime. Therefore, this paper argues that Lesotho 
must adopt a comprehensive legal structure to deter and prosecute cybercrime. It does 
this by examining international and national approaches to cybercrime, with a view to 
providing guidance for an effective framework capable of addressing this ‘new’ 
crime. Cybercrime is a major global challenge requiring coordinated international 
effort. In a networked world no island is an island; cybercrime penetrates all countries 
because of its ability to cross national boundaries. Further, this paper suggests a model 
law that is based on the first international treaty which plays a key role in combating 
cybercrime. Finally, it recognises that legislation alone cannot fight cybercrime; law 
enforcement must be equipped to implement the law, and private citizens must know 
about cybercrime and the need to protect themselves and their systems and networks. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DEFINING CYBERCRIME 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The rapidly growing danger from criminal activities committed on the Internet, 
broadly defined as cybercrime, is beginning to claim attention in many national 
governments.1 In Lesotho, however, current criminal laws can hardly be enforced 
against cybercrime. Cybercrime is a new phenomenon and Lesotho has not enacted 
laws to combat it. This absence of legal protection means that businesses and society 
must resort to technical measures to protect themselves against cybercrime.2 Although 
self-protection is essential, it is not enough to fight cybercrime and to make Lesotho a 
safe place to conduct business.3 Criminals have discovered that the Internet provides 
excellent opportunities and benefits for illicit business and other criminal activities at 
a minimal risk.4 ‘When the Internet was developed, the founding fathers of the 
Internet hardly had any inclination that the Internet could also be misused for criminal 
activities. Today, there are many disturbing things happening in cyberspace.’5 
Obviously, ‘[i]t was just a matter of time before criminals discovered the advantages 
of computers … computers make it increasingly possible to get proprietary 
information of financial institutions and other firms.’6 Indeed, Lesotho can prosecute 
some types of this illegal activity (such as forgery and fraud) using current criminal 
laws, but some activities (such as hacking and the dissemination of computer viruses) 
cannot be covered by existing laws. 
 
                                               
1
 See McConnell International ‘Cybercrime…punishment? archaic laws threaten global information’ 
(December 2000). Available at http://www.mcconnellinternational.com/services/cybercrime.htm 
[Accessed 20 June 2006]. 
2
 See ibid. 
3
 See ibid. McConnell International’s argument does not specifically address Lesotho; it generally 
refers to all those countries unable to prosecute cybercrime. 
4
 See Phil Williams ‘Organized crime and cybercrime: synergies, trends, and responses’ (13 August 
2001). Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0801/ijge/gj07.htm [Accessed 4 July 2006]. 
5
 Shri Pavan Duggal ‘Cyber assault & cybercrimes.’ Available at 
http://cyberlaws.net/cyberindia/cyberassault.htm [Accessed 11 April 2006]. 
6
 Glenn D Baker ‘Trespassers will be prosecuted: computer crime in the 1990s’ (1993) 12 
Computer/Law Journal 61at 62. 
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Lesotho is part of the world now run by all electrons; ‘ones and zeros… little 
bits of data’, with information technologies affecting virtually every aspect of 
business and society.7 While the Internet is a great communications tool for ordinary 
law-abiding citizens, at the same time, it is a powerful and dangerous tool for 
criminals; criminals use the internet as an ideal channel and instrument for many 
criminal activities.8 Therefore, Lesotho must ensure that it preserves mankind’s 
growing wealth and military power being stored and channelled on the Internet by 
enforcing the rule of law. 
 
Cybercrime creates significant law enforcement challenges for Lesotho. 
Generally, sophisticated Internet criminals are aware of the anonymity the Internet 
offers, and the difficulties that law enforcement encounters in piercing this veil.9 As a 
result, these criminals adjust their activities to maximise their anonymity on the 
Internet.10 In response to the misuse of computer systems and networks, Lesotho must 
criminalise specific conduct, and create civil or private rights to ensure creating 
enforcement of violations of protected rights. Lesotho must draw on best practices 
from other countries and work closely with the industry to enact enforceable legal 
protections against cybercrime.11 
 
1.1 Challenges facing Lesotho 
 
Lesotho’s criminal laws are based on the common law and the statutes.12 Lesotho’s 
traditional classification of existing common law and statutory crimes does not cater 
for the prosecution of cybercrime. The existing criminal laws against trespass or 
                                               
7
 See Marc D Goodman ‘Why the police don’t care about computer crime’ (1997) 10 Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology 465 at 466. See also the Remarks of James K Robinson ‘Internet as the scene 
of crime’ International computer crime conference (29-31 May 2000). Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/roboslo.htm [Accessed 20 June 2006]. The Internet 
penetrates the whole world. 
8
 See Williams note 4. 
9
 See Joel Michael Schwarz ‘A case of identity: a gaping hole in the chain of evidence of cyber-crime’ 
(2003) 9 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 92 at 93. 
10
 See ibid. 
11
 See McConnell International note 1. McConnell International suggests that all countries must be able 
to prosecute cybercrime. 
12
 Lesotho’s common law is a mixture of Roman-Dutch law and some English law. See Sebastian 
Poulter Legal dualism in Lesotho (1979) 3-4. See also ‘The World Factbook.’ Available at 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/lt.html [Accessed 12 January 2007]. 
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breaking and entering are ill-suited to their ‘virtual’ counterparts. For instance, 
charging a hacker with the traditional crime of house-breaking would be difficult 
because a computer cannot amount to ‘premises,’ a required element in house-
breaking. Similarly, the Distributed Denial of Service attacks cannot be prosecuted 
with the common-law crime of malicious damage to property because information is 
not tangible enough to be regarded as physical ‘property’, a required element for 
malicious damage to property. Thus, for example, Lesotho’s laws cannot cover web 
pages like the e-commerce sites, Yahoo, CNN, and E-Bay that were hit by 
widespread, distributed denial of service attacks, as protected forms of property.13 
 
Cybercrime yields various ‘new’ forms of criminal activities that current laws 
do not cover, as the Philippines learned when attempting to prosecute the author of the 
May 2000 ‘Love Bug’ virus which spread worldwide, causing tremendous financial 
damage.14 ‘Since the Philippines had no cybercrime laws, creating and distributing the 
virus was not a crime’, and as a result, the perpetrator had to be released without 
being charged, despite the gravity of his act.15 Although some of the countries 
affected, such as the United States, have laws to prosecute the offence, extradition 
was impossible for the lack of any extradition treaty between the countries.16 
Furthermore, to execute such a treaty the relevant offence has to be criminal 
according to the laws of every country involved.17 Nevertheless, six weeks later the 
Philippines adopted cybercrime legislation and a few other countries have also 
followed suit.18 
 
                                               
13
 In February 2000, some Internet sites (among others Yahoo, CNN and E-Bay) were temporarily 
crippled by a malicious computer attack, ‘Denial of Service Attacks’, which shut them down. See 
Robinson note 7. 
14
 McConnell International note 1. 
15
 See, for example, Marc D Goodman and Susan W Brenner ‘The emerging consensus on criminal 
conduct in cyberspace’ (2002) 3 UCLA Journal of Law and Technology. See also Susan W Brenner 
‘Cybercrime investigation and prosecution: the role of penal and procedural law’ (2001) vol. 8(2) 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law. Available at 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/indices/issue/v8n2.html [Accessed 25 January 2007]. 
16
 See, for example, Abraham A Purugganan ‘Philippines cybersecurity update: laws cases & other 
legal issues in Pauline C Reich (ed) Cybercrime and security (2006) 9. See also Lynn Burke ‘Love bug 
case dead in Manila’ Wired News (21 August 2000). Available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,38342-1.html?tw=wn_story_page_next1,00.html [Accessed 18 
January 2007]. 
17
 See ibid. 
18
 See, for example, McConnell note 1. See also Brenner note 15. 
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Cybercrime poses far greater challenges to law enforcement because of its 
ability to evade the reach of the existing criminal laws.19 Challenges facing Lesotho 
can generally be divided into three categories: 
 
• Technical challenges hindering law enforcement’s ability to trace and prosecute 
criminals operating online; 
 
• Legal challenges resulting from the fact that the laws and legal tools needed to 
investigate cybercrime lag behind technological structures and social changes; and 
 
• Operational challenges ensuring the creation of a network of well-trained, well-
equipped investigators and prosecutors working together with unprecedented 
speed even across national borders.20 
 
1.1.1 Technical challenges 
 
When a cybercrime occurs online, law enforcement must identify the person 
responsible; and to accomplish this, law enforcement must trace the crime from the 
victim back to the perpetrator. But herein lies the rub, ‘[t]racing a criminal in the 
electronic age, however, can be difficult, especially if we require international 
cooperation, if the perpetrator attempts to hide his identity, or if technology otherwise 
hinders our investigation.’21 
 
In the virtual world borders do not exist, and this is an attractive characteristic 
for criminal activity.22 The inherent transnational nature of the Internet provides an 
added degree of protection against law enforcement and allows criminals to operate 
with minimal risk.23 Criminals can weave their communications through service 
providers in various countries to cover their tracks, thus creating added complexities 
                                               
19
 See Goodman note 15. See also Williams note 4. 
20
 See Robinson note 7. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See Williams note 4. 
23
 See ibid. 
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to governments trying to find criminals.24 The establishment of mutual legal 
assistance between governments involves sharing evidence between only two 
countries, the victim’s country and the criminal’s country.25 Unfortunately, however: 
 
[W]hen a criminal sends his communications through a third, or fourth, or fifth country, the 
processes for international assistance involve successive periods of time before law 
enforcement can reach data in those latter countries, increasing the chances the data will be 
unavailable or lost, and the criminal will remain free to attack again.26 
 
To identify and trace global communications, Lesotho must work across 
borders, not only with her counterparts worldwide, but again with industry, to 
preserve evidence such as log files, e-mail records, and other files, and Lesotho must 
be able to do so swiftly, before such communication is altered or deleted.27 The 
investigation may falter if information is not obtained quickly.28 Simultaneously, 
tracing transmissions has to be done in real time, during an actual communication.29 
However, this can be technically difficult, as many communications technologies do 
not facilitate tracing.30 Although less sophisticated cybercriminals may leave 
electronic ‘fingerprints’, more experienced criminals can cover their tracks.31 Tracing 
cybercriminals becomes difficult and sometimes impossible, particularly when using 
anonymous software.32 Cybercriminals can hide their actions behind a veil of 
anonymity, which ranges from using ubiquitous cybercafes to sophisticated efforts 
that to cover Internet routing.33 Other services in other countries, such as pre-paid 
calling cards, facilitate anonymous communications and all of these technologies 
make tracing criminals difficult, at best, and impossible, at worst, though these 
services may have their advantages.34 
 
Countless other technical challenges face Lesotho, like those originating from 
Internet telephony, strong encryption, and wireless and satellite communications.35 
                                               
24
 See Robinson note 7. 
25
 See ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 See ibid. 
28
 See ibid. 
29
 See ibid. 
30
 See ibid. 
31
 See ibid. 
32
 See ibid. 
33
 See Williams note 4. 
34
 See Robinson note 7. 
35
 See ibid. 
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The technological advances in electronic commerce and communication that have led 
to the rapid growth of the Internet have also enabled international criminals to 
victimise people anywhere in the world, in unprecedented ways.36 
 
In a sophisticated age of anonymous, wireless, and encrypted communications 
how is Lesotho to identify and prosecute criminals who are victimising her citizens 
and businesses?37 What role does the country play when criminals located 
domestically use satellite and wireless communications, travelling exclusively through 
gateways located elsewhere?38 
 
Though the Internet may be borderless, national boundaries do exist for law 
enforcement. Therefore, Lesotho must create an environment conducive to finding 
and prosecuting cybercriminals and must teach the world at large to respect her 
sovereignty.39 In particular: 
 
We increasingly are dependent on mutual cooperation from other countries in investigating 
and prosecuting computer crimes. Simply stated, cybercrimes know no national boundaries, 
and the multi-jurisdictional nature of cybercrimes require a new multilateral approach to 
investigations and prosecutions.40 
 
1.1.2 Legal challenges 
 
The inherent transnational nature of the Internet, ‘rendering the traditional concept of 
distance meaningless’, allows criminals to act with impunity.41 They act with 
impunity because they are not afraid of justice. ‘Undeterred by the prospect of arrest 
or prosecution, cybercriminals around the world lurk on the Net as an omnipresent 
menace to the financial health of businesses, to the trust of their customers, and as an 
emerging threat to the nations’ security.’42 Lesotho must deal with cybercrime 
seriously. These criminal activities must not be considered mere pranks, but injuries 
with serious security and/or financial implications. 
                                               
36
 See ibid. 
37
 See ibid. 
38
 See ibid. 
39
 See ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Goodman (note 7) at 471. 
42
 McConnell International note 1. 
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Indubitably, cybercrime has become a serious threat to our nations.43 More 
seriously, it has become the ‘weapon of choice’ among white-collar criminals, similar 
to ‘any form of theft, except that it’s more subtle and it’s more sophisticated.’44 
 
Deterring and punishing cybercrime requires a legal structure capable of 
supporting the detection and successful prosecution of criminals.45 Experiences 
around the world have shown that a well defined rule of law that strongly deters 
cybercrime is critical to the effective protection of valuable information and 
networks.46 According to the McConnell International survey: 
 
Outdated laws and regulations, weak enforcement mechanisms for protecting networked 
information, create an inhospitable environment in which to conduct e-business within a 
country and across national boundaries. Inadequate legal protection of digital information can 
create barriers to its exchange and stunt the growth of e-commerce. As e-business expands 
globally, the need for strong and consistent means to protect networked information will 
grow.47 
 
Since crime is an offence against the authority of the state, Lesotho must 
assume the responsibility of protecting her citizens and act accordingly. Lesotho must 
be concerned with fulfilling her obligations to her citizens, namely, protecting lives, 
property, and morality, and with ensuring her own survival.48 Adopting cybercrime 
legislation is necessary in Lesotho, to create a healthy electronic commerce 
environment. As the United States Justice Department notes,‘[l]eft unchallenged 
computer crime poses a serious threat to the health and safety of our citizens, and may 
stifle the Internet’s power as a tool to communicate, engage in commerce, expand 
people’s educational opportunities around the globe.’49 To prosecute cybercrime 
effectively Lesotho needs a clearly defined legal structure, but Lesotho has not 
adopted any cybercrime legislation. When one country criminalises cybercrime and 
the other does not, co-operation to prosecute the crime becomes impossible.50 Indeed, 
                                               
43
 See Baker note 6. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 See, for example, Robinson note 7. 
46
 See, for example, McConnell International note 7. The most notable example is the Philippines with 
insufficient laws to prosecute the perpetrator of the ‘Love Bug’ virus, resulting in great financial 
damage worldwide. 
47
 Note 1. 
48
 See Goodman note 15. 
49
 CNN.com ‘Study: Most nations’ laws lag on cybercrime’ (6 December 2000). Available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/12/06/crime.tech.reut/index.html [Accessed 11 April 
2006]. 
50
 See, for example, Robinson note 7. See also Brenner note 15. 
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inadequate systems for international legal assistance and extradition can prevent the 
prosecution of criminals, as the ‘Love Bug’ virus incident taught the investigators.51 
Obviously, Lesotho cannot take any action against cybercriminals before adopting 
laws that criminalise the activities these criminals engage in: 
 
National governments should examine their current statutes to determine whether they are 
sufficient to combat the kinds of crimes in this report [the ‘new’ cybercrime offences, mostly 
dealing with information security]. Where gaps exist, governments should draw on best 
practices from other countries and work closely with the industry to enact enforceable legal 
protections against these new crimes.52 
 
In addition: 
 
The information infrastructure has significant implications for the governance of an 
information society. Despite the popular perception, the global information infrastructure 
(GII) is not a lawless place. Rather, it poses a fundamental challenge for effective leadership 
and governance. Laws, regulations and standards can, do, and will affect infrastructure 
development and the behaviour of GII participants. Rules and rule making do exist.53 
 
Although cybercrime is a menace to society and Lesotho does not have laws to 
prosecute it, people may still not even be aware of it.  Nevertheless, it is a potential 
problem.54 Therefore, individuals and businesses will want to be reassured that the 
‘Net’ will not be used systematically to undermine their security while criminals need 
to know that the law will not tolerate their criminal misconduct. Additionally, Lesotho 
needs cybercrime legislation to avoid becoming a home base providing ‘safe havens’ 
from which criminals can conduct their transnational operations. ‘As cyber crime 
increasingly breaches national borders, nations perceived as havens run the risk of 
having their electronic messages blocked by the network.’55 Further, Lesotho can use 
cybercrime laws to apprehend and prosecute perpetrators for their explicit acts 
without relying on outdated laws to cover ‘new’ offences.56 Furthermore, Lesotho can 
                                               
51See ibid. 
52
 McConnell International note 1. 
53
 Joel R Reidenberg ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’ (1996) 45 Emory Law 
Journal 911 at 912. 
54
 See Goodman (note 7) at 486. 
55
 McConnell note 1. 
56
 See Stein Schjolberg and Amanda Hubbard ‘Harmonizing national legal approaches on cybercrime’ 
at 5. Available at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Harmonizing_National_and_Legal_
Approaches_on_Cybercrime.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2006]. 
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also use cybercrime laws to gather evidence for use in courts of law and for 
establishing precedents and ethical standards more significantly through judgements.57 
 
1.1.3 Operational challenges 
 
Cybercrime raises complex technical and legal issues which will require Lesotho to 
have individuals dedicated to cybercrime and these individuals must have a sound 
understanding of computers and telecommunications.58 Technological complexities 
and the rapidly changing technologies mean that law enforcement must work on cases 
full-time, immersing themselves in computer-related investigations and 
prosecutions.59 Also: 
 
Given the quickly evolving nature of computer technology, our nations must also continue to 
increase their computer forensic capabilities, which are so essential in computer crime 
investigations. Twenty years ago, a new police officer was given a gun, a flashlight, and a 
notepad. When that officer retired, the three items would be returned to the police department, 
and the only intervening equipment expenses would have been replacement bullets, batteries, 
and note paper. Today, keeping pace with computer criminals means that law enforcement 
experts in this field must be properly equipped with the latest hardware and software.60 
 
1.2 Which way Lesotho? 
 
‘In a world where no island is an island’, Lesotho’s failure to address the need for 
cybercrime legislation may have grave consequences for the rest of the world, as 
occurred in the Philippines with the ‘Love Bug’ virus.61 Equally important, adopting 
cybercrime legislation would bring Lesotho into consensus with the penal laws 
adopted by other nations.62 Additionally, to avoid a repeat of the ‘Love Bug’ episode 
and to make the country a safe place in which to conduct business, Lesotho must 
devise a set of crimes to use to pursue cybercriminals wherever they are operating.63 
                                               
57
 See ibid. 
58
 See Robinson note 7. 
59
 See ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 See, for example, Goodman note 15. See also Brenner note 15. Further, see the discussion of the 
‘Love Bug’ virus at 1.1 above and at 2.1.2 below. 
62
 See Goodman note 15. 
63
 See, for example, Goodman note 15. See also Brenner note 15. 
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Besides, countries with inadequate legal protections will be less able to compete in the 
new economy.64 
 
However, the difficultly lies in properly defining the laws required to 
apprehend and prosecute cybercriminals to the fullest extent of the law.65 Yet, the 
approach could also be simple; creating an entirely new model for the ‘new’ offences 
and modifying the traditional model to accommodate online criminal activity.66 Just 
as the human mind is ingenious enough to devise new strategies for committing 
crimes; so does human ingenuity needs to be channelled into developing effective and 
regulatory measures of combating cybercrime. 
 
The paper argues that cybercrime legislation is necessary for Lesotho. It 
begins by examining the nature of cybercrime. To illustrate the extent of cybercrime, 
the paper then discusses the most common types of the crime, advancing reasons for 
the adoption of cybercrime legislation. The paper then investigates international and 
national approaches to combating cybercrime. Next, the paper discusses how Lesotho 
can make the changes necessary to deter and prosecute criminals using the anonymity 
of the Internet in criminal activities, and concludes that cybercrime legislation is 
necessary to combat this ‘new’ phenomenon. The paper concludes by making some 
remarks about enacting cybercrime legislation for Lesotho. 
 
2. Definition of cybercrime 
 
Essentially, cybercrime consists of any criminal activity committed from or against a 
computer or network.67 The terms ‘computer crime,’ ‘Information Technology crime,’ 
and ‘high tech crime’ can also be used to refer to this type of criminal behaviour.68 
The crimes committed can be of the conventional straightforward type using new 
                                               
64
 McConnell International note 1. 
65
 See Goodman note 15. 
66
 See ibid. 
67See, for example, Susan W Brenner ‘Cybercrime law and policy in the United States’ in Pauline C 
Reich (ed) Cybercrime and security (2005) at 1. See also Xan Raskin and Jeannie Schaldach-Paiva 
‘Eleventh survey of white collar crime’ (1996) 33 American Criminal Law Review 541 at 542. Further, 
see Maya Babu ‘What is cybercrime?’ Available at http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/702 
[Accessed 4 October 2006]. 
68
 See Goodman note 15. 
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technologies, or they can be new types of crimes committed using highly technical 
equipment to manipulate and infiltrate computer systems that may be on the other side 
of the globe.69 
 
2.1 The Nature of cybercrime 
 
Cybercrime is global in nature; it knows no national boundaries: 
 
As networked communications and e-commerce expand around the globe, businesses and 
consumers become more and more vulnerable to the reach of criminals. The global nature of 
the Internet enables criminals to hide their identity, commit crimes remotely from anywhere in 
the world; and to communicate with their confederates internationally. This can happen in 
nearly any type of crime, from violent crime, terrorism, and drug-trafficking, to the 
distribution of child pornography and stolen intellectual property, and attacks on e-commerce 
merchants.70 
 
Cybercrimes differ from real-world crimes in four respects: 
 
• they are easy to commit; 
• they need few resources compared to the amount of damage potentially caused; 
• they can be committed in any jurisdiction without the perpetrator necessarily 
being at the scene of the crime; and 
• they are often not clearly defined as criminal.71 
 
The nature of cybercrime can be summed up thus: 
 
In the networked world, the new generation of vandals and data thugs do not need to have 
physical contact with the victim. Data is easily copied, transmitted, modified or destroyed. As 
a result, the scene of crime is a particularly difficult one: there are no fingerprints or traces, 
identification of the culprits is nearly impossible, apprehension even more so and the legal 
framework does not make adequate provision for justice in this kind of crime.72 
 
 
 
                                               
69
 See, for example, Duggal note 5. See also Goodman note 15. Further, see Brenner note 67. 
70
 Robinson note 7. 
71
 See McConnell International note 1. 
72
 Eduardo Gelbstein and Ahmad Kamal ‘Information insecurity’ in Pauline C Reich (ed) Cybercrime  
and security (2005) 5 
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2.1.1 Easy commission 
 
Without ever leaving the comfort of their own homes criminals can victimise 
individuals and businesses anywhere in the world, with very little risk of 
apprehension.73 A criminal merely needs a computer and a modem connected to the 
Internet to commit a cybercrime. Clearly, conducting a crime is more efficient in 
cyberspace than in the physical world.74 A case of identity theft serves as a good 
example here: the Internet allows the identity thief to obtain personal identifiers of 
multiple persons more quickly and it also allows them to obtain high-quality fake 
identification tools (drivers’ licences, birth certificates, social security cards, and 
others).75 Basically, the ‘faceless’ nature of e-commerce defeats the purpose of credit-
cards, driver’s licences and other identification tools.76 In the offline world of credit 
purchase transactions, the following prevention and limitation measures can be 
employed to control identity theft: 
 
• an identity thief can only transact once at a given location and the identity thief 
needs time to travel to the next location; 
 
• a credit card used by the identity thief has certain security features on the front of 
the card and on the back in the black strip; 
 
• an identity thief must sign the purchase receipt that must be compared to the 
signature on the card; and 
 
• an identity thief must be at the scene of the transaction which could lead to 
physical observation and possible arrest, and this significantly deters many people 
from attempting to commit this type of crime.77 
 
                                               
73
 See generally Williams note 4. See also Gelbestein ibid. 
74
 Gerald R Ferrera, et al Cyberlaw: text and cases (2001) 298. 
75
 Identity theft occurs when someone uses the identifying information of another person – name, social 
security number, mother’s maiden name, or other personal information – to commit fraud or engage in 
other unlawful activities. See Social Security Online ‘Identity theft.’ Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/idtheft.htm [Accessed 4 December 2006]. 
76
 See Norman A Willox ‘Identity theft: authentication as a solution’ in Alan E Brill, Fletcher N 
Baldwin and Robert J Munro (eds) Cybercrime and Security (2001) 3. 
77
 See ibid 3-4. 
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Unfortunately, the ‘faceless’ world of Internet credit purchases does not 
provide any prevention or limitation measures.78 The identity thief is at liberty to 
commit many fraudulent transactions; no physical card or receipt is required; and 
again the privacy of the Internet offers the identity thief anonymity.79 At the same 
time, the Internet offers ample opportunities to commit crimes instantaneously.80 
Additionally, ‘[t]he Internet is quick, convenient and virtually any amount of 
information can be sent almost anywhere in the blink of an eye.’81 For instance, in the 
physical world when a thief steals credit cards (with or without a Personal 
Identification Number or PIN), the thief needs time to use these cards, and the owner 
can report them as lost or stolen before they are used.82 However, in the networked 
world when credit card details are stolen, the owner knows nothing about this and the 
thief who has stolen the person’s electronic identification can use this information 
immediately.83 Furthermore, in the networked world goods have no weight; therefore, 
stealing, transferring and storing them become easy.84 
 
2.1.2 Few resources vis-à-vis damage 
 
The Internet offers enormous opportunities to commit crimes using limited 
resources.85 Armed with computers, computer networks, and related information and 
communications technologies crimes can easily be committed.86 Remarkably, a 
criminal ‘can steal more with a computer than with a gun’ and ‘do more damage with 
a keyboard than with a bomb.’87 Perhaps the most notable example is the February 
2000 malicious computer attack referred to as the ‘Denial of Service Attacks’ that 
temporarily caused major disruptions to the most prominent Internet commerce sites 
such as Yahoo, CNN, and E-Bay, thereby shutting them down.88 Another typical 
example is the distribution of the short-lived, yet destructive ‘Love Bug’ virus, in May 
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2000, that affected thousands of corporate websites around the world; many 
companies had to shut down their e-mails systems to stop the spread of the virus.89 
The effects of the virus have been described as follows: 
 
The virus destroyed files and stole passwords; it appeared in Hong Kong on May 11, 2000 and 
spread rapidly throughout the world. 
….[I]n the offices of the German newspaper Abendblatt in Hamburg, system administrators 
watched in horror as the virus gobbled up 2,000 digital photographs in the picture archive. In 
Belgium ATMs were disabled, leaving citizens cashless. In Paris cosmetics maker L’Oreal 
shut down its e-mail servers, as did other businesses throughout the Continent. As much as 70 
% of the computers in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden were laid low. The companies 
affected made up a Who’s Who of industry and finance, including Ford, Siemens, Silicon 
Graphics and Fidelity Investments. Even Microsoft … got so badly battered that it finally 
severed outside e-mail links at its Redmond, Wash., headquarters. 
Governments too, felt the pain. In London, Parliament shut down its servers before the Love 
Bug’s assault …. 
On Capitol Hill, crippled e-mail systems forced an atypical silence in the halls of Congress…. 
The Bug infected 80% of all federal agencies, including both the Defense and State 
departments, leaving them temporarily out of e-mail contact with their far-flung outposts…. 
[T]he virus corrupted no fewer than four classified, internal Defense Department e-mail 
systems….The virus affected NASA and CIA on its two hour race around the world, three 
times faster than its predecessor Melissa. The virus is estimated to have ultimately affected 
over forty-five million users in more than twenty countries. The various estimates of the 
damage caused, ranging from two billion dollars to ten billion, reflect on the inherent difficult 
of assessing the harm inflicted by cybercrime.90 
 
2.1.3 Unrestricted jurisdiction 
 
As noted: 
 
Unlike real-world ‘crime’, cybercrime does not require any degree of physical proximity 
between the victim and the victimizer at the moment the crime is committed. Cybercrime is 
unbounded crime, borderless crime. It can be committed by someone who is located anywhere 
in the world against a victim who is in another city, another state, another country. All the 
perpetrator requires is access to a computer that is linked to the Internet; with this, he can 
inflict ‘harm’ upon someone directly, by attacking their computer, say, indirectly, by obtaining 
information that lets him assume their identity and use it to commit fraud on a grand scale.91 
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In the networked world crime is not confined within boundaries, since a criminal does 
not have to be physically present in a jurisdiction to commit a cybercrime.92 A 
cybercrime can be committed from anywhere and against any ‘computer’ user in the 
world; a very attractive characteristic for criminal activity.93 A criminal is able to 
commit crimes across international borders with a level of anonymity, and the scene 
of crime becomes difficult to identify.94 Tracing and identifying a criminal in the 
digital world can be almost impossible, as can the apprehending of the criminal, as 
this may depend on international cooperation.95 The distribution of the ‘Love Bug’ 
virus affecting more than twenty countries demonstrates how easy it can be to commit 
crimes across borders.96 As one study noted: 
 
Effective law enforcement is complicated by the transnational nature of cyberspace. 
Mechanisms of cooperation across national borders to solve and prosecute crimes are complex 
and slow. Cybercriminals can defy the conventional realms of sovereign nations, originating 
an attack from almost any computer in the world, passing it across multiple national 
boundaries, or designing attacks that appear to be originating from foreign sources. Such 
techniques drastically increase both the technical and legal complexities of investigating and 
prosecuting cybercrimes.97 
 
2.1.4 Unclear definition 
 
Most countries’ laws are inadequate to prosecute cybercrimes; the existing laws 
cannot be enforced against such crimes.98 ‘In cyberspace archaic laws often make 
crime and punishment rather distant relatives.’99 The traditional classification of 
existing common law crimes does not cater for the prosecution of cybercrime. A 
typical example is a denial of service attack, which cannot be prosecuted as 
vandalism, trespass, burglary, theft, arson, or extortion even though it is a malicious 
activity, damaging or perhaps even destroying the victim’s ability to conduct 
business.100 Accordingly: 
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No ‘property’ is damaged; there is no intrusion into a protected area (with or without the intent 
to commit an offence therein); nothing is stolen (at least not in the sense that the perpetrator 
‘takes’ property from the victim and thereby enriches himself at the victim’s expense); no fire 
or explosives are used to damage property; and nothing of value is typically extorted in 
exchange for ceasing the attack.101 
 
Cybercrime yields new and different types of activities capable of evading the 
reach of existing criminal laws.102 Criminals can easily exploit gaps in their own 
country’s criminal laws to victimise their fellow citizens with impunity.103 Criminals 
can also exploit gaps in other country’s criminal laws to victimise the citizens of those 
and other countries.104 This was one of the lessons of the ‘Love Bug’ virus. The 
author of the virus, Onel de Guzman, a computer programming student in the 
Philippines, when finally arrested could not be prosecuted under the Philippines laws 
because no laws prohibited the distribution of a computer virus, even one which 
destroyed valuable information such as computer files or stole passwords.105 
 
2.2 Types of cybercrimes 
 
A cybercrime can be committed by using a computer in three main ways: 
 
• As the target of a crime 
• As a tool for a crime 
• As incidental to a crime 
 
2.2.1 A computer as the target of a crime 
 
This occurs by attacking the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of data.106 
The criminal attacks a computer system by breaking into the system and bombarding 
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it from outside.107 Examples include hacking (gaining unauthorised access to a 
computer system) and cracking (gaining unauthorised access to a computer system to 
commit another crime such as destroying information in that system).108 Other 
examples are data theft, theft of intellectual property (such as trade secrets), the ‘Love 
Bug’ virus that damaged computers around the world resulting in great financial loss, 
and the February 2000 Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) that were 
launched against Yahoo, CNN and E-Bay.109 To carry out a DDoS attack, the attacker 
uses compromised computer systems to flood the target systems with messages that 
essentially shut it down.110 The computer is absolutely essential for committing these 
crimes; before the advent of the computer these crimes never existed and 
consequently jurisdictions will need to address these “new” crimes.111 
 
2.2.2 A computer as a tool for a crime 
 
Like most tools, computers can be used for criminal purposes.112 A computer as a tool 
for a crime occurs by simply using computers, computer systems, and related 
information and communication technology to commit traditional crimes.113 Using 
computers merely facilitates committing the crime. Notably, ‘[b]y introducing new 
programming instructions, or manipulating computers’ legitimate functions for illegal 
purposes, perpetrators exploit computers for the commission of crimes.’114 The use of 
computer technology as a tool to commit a crime does not alter the nature of the 
offence. This type covers crimes that are prevalent in the physical world, but that are 
now increasing on the Internet.115 These are the traditional crimes such as theft, fraud, 
forgery, stalking, trafficking, distribution, posting and dissemination of child or other 
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pornography, intellectual property violations and even murder.116 These crimes are 
not substantially ‘new’ but existing criminal laws may not be adequate to prosecute 
these crimes; therefore, states will have to adjust their laws.117 
 
2.2.3 A computer as incidental to a crime 
 
A computer is not essential for committing a crime in this category.118 These are 
traditional crimes that have existed long before computers did, but a computer may 
still be of significant use in committing the crime.119 The use of a computer allows for 
the more efficient commission of a crime, for example, using a computer for illegal 
book-making, or when a blackmailer uses a computer to generate blackmail letters or 
e-mails.120 Some view this category as not representing a ‘true’ variety of cybercrime 
because the computer plays a peripheral role and, as a result, adoption of new 
substantive cybercrime law is hardly required for the apprehension and prosecution of 
the culprit.121 Although this may be the case, crimes of this type still pose challenges 
for law enforcement by increasing the investigative work involved whenever 
computer technology is used for illegal purposes.122 Other ‘incidental’ cybercrimes 
include paedophiles’ child pornography records and drug dealers’ financial records on 
their computers.123 
 
2.3 Categories of cybercrimes 
 
In many instances cybercrimes overlap, but basically, they are divided into three 
major categories: 
 
• Cybercrimes against persons 
                                               
116
 See, for example, Brenner (note 67) 3. See also Ferrera (note 74) 302. Further, see Goodman (note 
7) at 469 and Robinson note 7. 
117
 See, for example, Brenner (note 67) 3. 
118
 See, for example, Ferrera (note 74) 303. 
119
 See, for example, ibid. See also Goodman (note 7) at 469. 
120
 See, for example, Ferrera (note 74) 303. 
121
 See, for example, Brenner (note 67) 2. 
122
 See, for example, Brenner (note 67) 2. See also Robinson note 7. 
123
 See, for example, Goodman (note 7) at 469. See also Robinson note 7. 
  
19 
• Cybercrimes against property 
• Cybecrimes against Government 
 
2.3.1 Cybercrimes against persons 
 
This category deals with cybercrimes committed against persons. Typical examples 
are: 
 
• Obscene material/pornography 
• Cyber-harassment 
• Cyber-stalking 
• Hate speech 
 
Obscene material/pornography involves the trafficking, distribution, posting, 
and dissemination of obscene material including pornography, indecent exposure, and 
child pornography.124 This type of crime is one of the most serious cybercrimes; its 
potential effects can hardly be overstated.125 Paedophiles carry out many activities 
over the Internet, including viewing images, discussing activities, arranging tourism, 
and enticing a child to a meeting.126 The transnational nature of the Internet affords 
child molesters and pornographers unlimited opportunities to target and recruit new 
victims. It allows sexual predators to stalk minors discreetly from their homes. 
Unquestionably, this is the reality: ‘[a] minor girl in Ahmedabad was lured to a 
private place through cyberchat by a man, who, along with his friends, attempted to 
gangrape her. As some passersby heard her cry, she was rescued.’127 Clearly, this 
crime is harmful to minors and, if not controlled, it could have extremely damaging 
effects. 
 
Cyber-harassment is a malicious offence; it involves sending repeated, 
threatening or harassing messages using cyberspace, and targeting a particular 
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person.128 It can be sexual, racial, religious, or another type of harassment,129 as this 
infamous California case illustrates: 
 
An honors graduate from the University of San Diego terrorized five female university 
students over the Internet for more than a year. The victims received hundreds of violent and 
threatening e-mails, sometimes receiving four or five messages a day. The graduate student … 
told police he committed the crimes because he thought the women were laughing at him and 
causing others to ridicule him. In fact, the victims had never met him.130 
 
This crime is closely related to the issue of the violation of privacy of 
netizens.131 Privacy is valuable and close to the heart of every citizen, and the law 
protects people’s privacy, but the Internet can allow for this privacy to be violated.132 
 
Cyber-stalking is also a malicious offence that involves the crime of stalking 
by using a computer and the Internet, and the offence is aimed at a specific person.133 
Another notorious California case illustrates this offence: 
 
[A] 50-year-old former security guard … used the Internet to solicit the rape of a woman who 
rejected his romantic advances …. [H]e terrorized his 28-year-old victim by impersonating her 
in various Internet chat rooms and online bulletin boards, where he posted, along with her 
telephone number and address, messages that she fantasized of being raped. On at least six 
occasions, sometimes in the middle of the night, men knocked on the woman’s door saying 
they wanted to rape her….134 
 
Hate speech is the dissemination of threatening hate-filled messages targeting 
people merely on account of their race, colour, sex, religion, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation.135 Hate speech is focused more generally, but it is still traumatic for those 
against whom it is levelled, and it is spreading widely, with the aid of the Internet. For 
example: 
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The e-mail address of a group of Jewish students in Germany was bombarded with more than 
17,000 messages from adolf@hitler.com containing a threat to repeat the Holocaust. The 
murder of six million Jews, the sender threatened, would start Nov. 9 - the anniversary of 
Kristallnacht, the Nov. 9, 1938 ‘Night of Broken Glass’ when Nazi regime orchestrated 
attacks on Jews and Jewish businesses across Germany in a harbinger of the Holocaust. 
Germany’s cyber police conceded they were powerless to investigate because the e-mails were 
sent via a server in the U.S., material that falls outside German laws that make Neo-Nazi 
propaganda a crime. Germany has repeatedly complained that United States free speech laws 
have crippled its efforts to stop the spread of Neo-Nazi ideas via the Internet.136 
 
2.3.2 Cybercrimes against property 
 
This category involves cybercrimes against all forms of property. These are crimes 
committed against the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of data and 
systems. These crimes include: 
 
• Hacking and cracking 
• Denial of service and distributed denial of service 
• Virus dissemination 
• Sabotage 
• Extortion 
• Industrial espionage 
• Forgery 
• Fraud 
• Software and other copyright infringement 
 
Hacking and cracking are aimed at accessing a system or data. Hacking refers 
to unauthorised access to computers, and tampering with precious confidential data 
and information.137 Hackers generally enter systems merely for the personal 
satisfaction of penetrating them, and seldom damage them. 
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Cracking involves using various programs and programming abilities with the 
malicious intent to break into a system.138 Crackers intend to cause damage when 
accessing online systems. They may bring computers to a grinding halt, or make 
copies of sensitive information for unlawful use. Hacking and cracking are not only 
security-related issues but also constitute an invasion of privacy, since hackers and 
crackers tamper with precious confidential data without the knowledge and consent of 
the owner.139 Unfortunately, no computer is cracking proof.140 The denial of service 
attacks experienced by the popular commercial sites like Yahoo, CNN and E-Bay are 
notable examples of this type of cybercrime.141 
 
Denial of service and distributed denial of service result from transmitting too 
many e-mails, causing the recipients’ computers to crash.142 This is committed by first 
breaking into the system or network. The February 2000 Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks launched against Yahoo, CNN, E-Bay and others, causing massive business 
disruption, are by far the biggest ever.143 In another incident in 1999, a group of 
people calling themselves the Electrohippies organised a Distributed Denial of 
Service attack on the World Trade Organization (WTO).144 The Electrohippies set up 
a site, a virtual sit-in, to help tie up the WTO’s Web servers. Clicking on the sit-in 
link made a user’s computer request information continually from WTO servers, thus 
tying up the user’s Internet connection.145 Clearly, ‘[t]his was essentially the use of 
hacker’s denial-of-service techniques to perform an act of (in their words) civil 
disobedience in the shape of an electronic sit-in.’146 Sometimes, these attacks can be 
automated by using someone’s computer unknowingly as the cyber-hippies did.147 
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Virus dissemination is the introduction of software damaging to systems or 
data. This refers to the creation and transmission of harmful computer programs 
which do irreparable damage to computer systems.148 This includes any program or 
code doing harm to a system or data. A computer virus is a specific type of malicious 
code, which replicates itself and inserts copies of new versions into other programs 
when it is executed with the infected program.149 A typical example is the ‘Love Bug’ 
virus that affected about 45 million computers and caused tremendous damage.150 
Another example is the Melissa virus. This virus first appeared on the Internet in 
March 1999, spreading throughout computer systems in the United States and Europe, 
and causing massive damages to computers worldwide.151 
 
Sabotage involves the disconnecting, unauthorised modifying or destruction of 
a network or system, which can even be done without a physical presence.152 A 
hacker with malicious intent can disrupt the operating of crucial items by merely 
corrupting password files, modifying parameters or injecting malicious code.153 The 
most serious sabotage occurs when a person accesses a computer room disguised as a 
maintenance engineer.154 If security is weak and the person is unaccompanied and 
unmonitored, the person can cause massive damage in a very short time in a way that 
can remain undetected for hours.155 
 
Extortion involves the use of force and intimidation to threaten to disrupt 
information and communication systems to induce the victim to give something of 
value (usually, money).156 An example is when a blackmailer plants a digital time or 
logic bomb and threatens to destroy a system unless the victim pays.157 Another 
example is an experience of one company in 2001: 
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Universe did not pay the thief A 19-year old Russian student using the name ‘Maxim’ stole 
300,000 credit card numbers from the computer server of CD Universe. Maxim extorted CD 
Universe by agreeing to destroy the customer data he had stolen in exchange for $100,000 
cash. CD quickly enough for his liking, and Maxim published the credit card and customer 
data of 25,000 victims online. The event was widely reported in the media and was quite 
damaging to CD Universe’s reputation … Maxim still remains at large.158 
 
Extortion schemes may sometimes be unsuccessful, but when conducted 
subtly they incur a low level of risk and considerable gain for the perpetrator.159 This 
crime might not be widely reported as companies have a tendency not to expose their 
vulnerabilities as they fear the effect of such reporting on their reputations. 
Nonetheless, this crime is likely to increase as criminals exploit the enormous new 
opportunities that networked systems offer.160 
 
Industrial espionage involves breaking into a system or network and stealing 
information about product development, commercial strategies, staff salaries, and 
other confidential matters.161 This can be achieved leaving little or no evidence of the 
theft.162 The practice dates back a long way. Ever since the industrial revolution 
espionage has been a big issue, especially for businesses in a leadership position in a 
competitive environment requiring sophisticated research.163 Industrial espionage is 
rapidly growing because computer systems and networks are used to document 
experiments and research.164 The sponsor of the espionage benefits by deriving 
knowledge worth millions at a minimal expense and with minimal risk.165 On the one 
hand, the Internet stores valuable and sensitive information, but it also exposes the 
information to a high risk of this kind of crime. A typical example is an industrial spy 
stealing trade secrets to sell to a business rival. 
 
Forgery refers to the illegal inputting, altering, deleting, or suppressing of 
computer data resulting in apparently authentic data with the intent that it be 
considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic regardless of 
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whether the data is directly readable and intelligible.166 Examples include fictitious 
websites that falsely represent themselves as legitimately established companies, 
assuming a false identity in e-mails for fraudulent purposes, and posting false 
information on Internet bulletin boards to manipulate stock market prices.167 
 
Fraud is using a computer system by inputting, altering, deleting or 
suppressing computer data or any interference with a computer or with the 
functioning of a computer system to cause loss of property to another person, with the 
fraudulent or dishonest intent to illegally obtain an economic benefit for oneself or for 
another.168 Fraud usually involves large amounts of money and no physical violence, 
and when it is done smoothly, fraud stands a good chance of remaining undetected. It 
could range from misleading offers for all kinds of property to promises and 
unfounded financial projections.169 Cybercriminals commit different types of fraud 
over computer networks, most commonly, credit card fraud, online auction fraud, mail 
fraud, and bank fraud. 
 
Software and other copyright infringement refers to the taking or copying of 
data, whether legally protected by other laws, such as privacy and copyright; and to 
protecting the illegal copying and distributing of legally or illegally obtained 
software.170 This activity is actionable regardless of whether any profits are made or 
contemplated.171 Distributing illegal and unauthorised software has been further 
strengthened by the birth of the personal computer and continues to be practised in 
many countries. Hardware and peripherals can also be copied. Piracy represents a 
remarkable loss to copyright owners while the thieves stand a good chance of evading 
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the law, and although nations have taken initiatives against it, the business continues 
to flourish.172 
 
2.3.3 Cybercrimes against Government 
 
Generally, the perpetrators of cybercrimes against Government have political 
motivations for their activities; however, determining the intent, identity or motivation 
with certainty is difficult until long after the commission of the offence. Examples 
include: 
 
• Cyberterrorism 
• Extortion 
• Espionage 
 
Cyberterrorism is the politically motivated use of computers as weapons or 
targets resulting in violence against non-combatant targets, by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents to influence an audience or cause a government to change its 
policies.173 Cyberterrorism also covers attacks destructive or disruptive enough to 
instil fear comparable to that resulting from a physical act of terrorism, for example, 
acts leading to death, injury, extended power outages, airplane crashes, or critical loss 
of confidence in the economy.174 For instance, a terrorist might break into an air 
traffic control system and manipulate it, causing plane crashes or collisions or break 
into computer systems and disrupt domestic banking, the stock exchange and 
international financial transactions leading to a major loss of confidence in the 
economy.175 
 
Extortion involves threats and disruptions or shut-downs of essential 
services.176 This crime manifests itself when a cracker breaks into government 
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computer systems and starts making demands, altering, disrupting, or shutting down 
the systems. For instance: 
 
[t]he Legion of Doom hacking group gained the ability to alter, disrupt, or shut down local 
telephone service. In one incident, 40 percent of a patient’s records were destroyed at a major 
medical center. In another incident, a teenager gained access to an airport’s traffic control 
system and left it without telephone or data service. Hackers routinely vandalize government 
Web sites and deface or otherwise destroy them.177 
 
Espionage involves spying on government entities or officials.178 Criminals 
use this activity to gather military and other intelligence. In one case, the first to make 
the international headlines, hackers in West Germany were arrested for breaking into 
the United States Government and corporate computers and selling United States 
military secrets to the Soviet KGB.179 Two fellow hacker spies turned in three of the 
hackers, while the fourth suspected hacker committed suicide when publicly 
implicated, but because the information stolen was not top secret the hackers were 
fined and sentenced to probation.180 
 
2.4 Other questionable activities  
 
The above list is not comprehensive. It merely outlines the most common criminal 
activities classified as cybercrime. Numerous other activities are taking place on the 
Internet about which the law is not always clear. There are concerns about what 
activities are actually criminal and in which jurisdiction. These activities include: 
 
• Arms and drug dealing 
• Hate speech 
• Pornography 
• Trading in stolen goods 
• Money laundering 
• Off shore unregulated gambling 
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• Political propaganda 
• Disinformation 
• Spamming 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
As the Internet becomes the medium through which more and more international trade 
occurs, the opportunities for other activities are likely to grow; undoubtedly, human 
ingenuity will continue to create new offences. In fact, ‘[t]he criminal is always a 
couple of jumps ahead of the policeman. As when the law plugs any of its numerous 
loopholes, the motivated criminal will always discover new cracks in the armor.’181 
However, in the final analysis, every jurisdiction reserves the right to make its own 
laws and if the law says an act is criminal (or not), so it is (or is not). As a result, 
crimes such as harassment, stalking and hate speech committed on the Internet may 
not necessarily be criminal depending on the jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER TWO: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS ON 
CYBERCRIME 
 
Overview 
 
Various international and regional governmental organisations have attempted to 
create ways to harmonise domestic legislation to improve law enforcement’s ability to 
address cybercrime. Particularly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (COE), the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight (G-8) have played leading and 
significant roles in creating awareness and cooperation in this regard. This chapter 
describes efforts that have been made to address cybercrime effectively. 
 
1. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
The OECD is an international organisation of 30 market democracies working 
together to address the economic, social and governance issues of a globalising world 
economy, as well as to exploit its opportunities.182 The OECD initiated the first 
comprehensive inquiry into the criminal law problems of computer crime on the 
international level. The organisation has recommended that basic criminal activities 
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committed on the Internet be criminalised and has also issued guidelines on the 
security of information systems (the Recommendation of the Council concerning 
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems of 26 November 1992, replaced 
by the Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security on 25 July 
2002).183 
 
1.1 The OECD Recommendation 
 
In 1983, the OECD in Paris appointed an expert committee to address computer 
related crime to harmonise European computer crime legislation.184 From 1983 to 
1985, the OECD surveyed the possibility of the international application and 
harmonisation of criminal laws addressing cybercrime and abuse.185 In 1986, the 
committee issued a report, Computer-related Crime: Analysis of Legal Policy in the 
OECD Area, which surveyed current laws and proposals for reform and 
recommended a list of acts that countries must criminalise.186 The list resulted from a 
comparative analysis of substantive law worldwide and outlined commonly 
recognised acts, which could constitute a common basis between the different 
approaches taken by member states, consisting of: 
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• the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer 
programs made wilfully with the intent to commit an illegal transfer of funds or of 
another thing of value; 
 
• the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer 
programs made wilfully with the intent to commit a forgery; 
 
• the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer 
programs, or other interference with computer systems, made wilfully with the 
intent to hinder the functioning of a computer and/or of a telecommunication 
system; 
 
• the infringement of the exclusive right of the owner of a protected computer with 
the intent to exploit commercially the program and put it on the market; and 
 
• the access to or the interception of a computer and/or telecommunication system, 
made knowingly and without the authorisation of the person responsible for the 
system, either by infringement of security measures or for other dishonest or 
harmful intentions.187 
 
1.2 The OECD Guidelines 
 
In 1992, the OECD Council and 24 of its Member states adopted the 
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems [hereinafter, ‘Recommendation’], to provide a foundational 
information security framework for the public and private sectors.188 The 
Recommendation contains Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems 
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[hereinafter, ‘Guidelines’].189 This framework involves laws, codes of conduct, 
technical measures, management and user practices, and public education 
provisions.190 The Guidelines focus on implementing minimum standards for the 
security of information systems and request Member countries to reform their penal 
systems by criminalising misuse of information systems and developing means for 
international cooperation.191 
 
The security of information systems aims to protect information systems 
users’ interests from harm resulting from failures of availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity.192 
 
One of the recommendations of the Guidelines was to review the Guidelines 
every five years to foster international co-operation on security of information 
systems and networks related issues.193 
 
In 1997, the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry 
reviewed the five-year progress made towards implementing the 1992 Guidelines.194 
The review was conducted by a questionnaire issued to OECD Member countries.195 
Among others, the review revealed that the responding countries had difficulties in 
developing laws and procedures relating to information security because of 
‘differences in the various legal systems and how they deal with security matters … 
such as … computer crimes.’196 The Members generally agreed that the Guidelines 
were still adequate and need not be revised.197 
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In 2002, the OECD Council recommended adopting the present OECD 
Guidelines, because the use of information systems and networks and the entire 
information technology environment had dramatically changed since 1992 when the 
first Guidelines were adopted.198 These continuing changes bring significant 
advantages which also raise new security issues.199 Hence, the OECD adopted these 
Guidelines for a greater awareness and understanding of security issues and the need 
to develop a ‘culture of security’.200 The Guidelines also focus on implementing 
minimum standards for the security of systems by: 
 
• Promoting a culture of security for participants to protect information systems and 
networks. 
 
• Alerting members of the risk of information systems, the measures to avoid the 
risk and the need to adopt and implement such measures. 
 
• Creating confidence among participants in information systems and networks and 
in the manner they are provided and used. 
 
• Providing reference in understanding security issues and respecting ethical values 
when developing and implementing coherent security measures for the security of 
information systems and networks. 
 
• Promoting co-operation and information sharing among participants in developing 
and implementing security measures. 
 
• Promoting considering security as important among participants involved in 
developing or implementing standards.201 
 
The Guidelines identify nine principles to consider in protecting information 
systems and providing for their security.202 The principles are complementary and 
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must be read as a whole.203 They relate to participants at all levels, including policy 
and operational levels.204 The principles are: 
 
• Awareness 
Participants should be aware of the need for security of information systems and 
networks and what they can do to enhance security. 
 
• Responsibility 
All participants are responsible for the security of information systems and 
networks. 
 
• Response 
Participants should act in a timely and co-operative manner to prevent, detect and 
respond to security incidents. 
 
• Ethics 
Participants should respect the legitimate interests of others. 
 
• Democracy 
The security of information systems and networks should be compatible with the 
essential values of a democratic society. 
 
• Risk assessment 
Participants should conduct risk assessments. 
 
• Security design and implementation 
Participants should incorporate security as an essential element of information 
systems and networks. 
 
• Security management 
Participants should adopt a comprehensive approach to security management. 
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• Reassessment 
Participants should review and reassess the security of information systems and 
networks, and make appropriate modifications to security policies, practices, 
measures and procedures.205 
 
The 2002 Recommendation replaces the 1992 Recommendation and the 
Guidelines will be reviewed again in 2007.206 
 
2. The Council of Europe 
 
The COE is an international organisation comprising 46 members, including all the 25 
members of the European Union.207 The COE seeks to promote democracy, and 
protect human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe.208 The COE has 
extensively engaged in the legal issues of computer-related crime.209 
 
2.1 The Recommendation No. R. (89) 9 
 
In 1985, the COE appointed an expert committee, the Select Committee of Experts on 
Computer-Related Crime of the Council of Europe, to discuss cybercrime issues.210 
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The Committee drafted Recommendation No. (89) 9, which the Council adopted on 
13 September 1989.211 The Recommendation emphasised the importance of a 
sufficient and quick response to cybercrime, the transborder character of cybercrime 
requiring harmonising law and practice, and improving international legal 
cooperation.212 Furthermore, it emphasised the need for international consensus in 
criminalising and addressing some cybercrimes.213 The Recommendation urges 
Member States to consider the European Committee on Crime Problems’ report, 
particularly the guidelines for national legislatures, when reviewing their legislation or 
enacting new legislation.214 The guidelines for national legislatures include a 
‘minimum list’ and ‘optional list’ of crimes.215 
 
2.1.1 The ‘minimum list’ 
 
The ‘minimum list’ addresses crimes to be prohibited and prosecuted by international 
consensus, including: 
 
• ‘Computer Fraud’: The input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer data 
or computer programs, or other interference with the course of data processing, 
that influences the result of data processing thereby causing economic or 
possessory loss of property of another person with the intent of procuring an 
unlawful economic gain for himself or for another person; 
 
• ‘Computer Forgery’: The input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer 
data or computer programs, or other interference with the course of data 
processing, in a manner or under such conditions, as prescribed by national law, 
that it would constitute an offence of forgery if it had been committed with respect 
to a traditional object of such an offence; 
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• ‘Damage to Computer Data or Computer Program’: The erasure, damaging, 
deterioration or suppression of computer data or computer programs without right; 
 
• ‘Computer Sabotage’: The input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer 
data or computer programs, or other interference with computer systems, with the 
intent to hinder the functioning of a computer or a telecommunication system; 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Access’: The access without right to a computer system or network 
by infringing security measures; 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Interception’: The interception, made without right and by 
technical means, of communications to, from and within a computer system or 
network. 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Reproduction of a Protected Computer Program’: The 
reproduction, distribution or communication to the public without right of a 
computer program which is protected by law; 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Reproduction of a Topography’: The reproduction without right of 
a topography protected by law, of a semi-conductor product, or the commercial 
exploitation or the importation for that purpose, done without right, of a 
topography or of a semi-conductor product manufactured by using the 
topography.216 
2.1.2 The ‘optional list’ 
 
The ‘optional list’ describes prominent offences on which international consensus 
would be difficult to reach; involving: 
 
• ‘Alteration of Computer Data or Computer Programs’: The alteration of computer 
data or computer programs without right; 
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• ‘Computer Espionage’: The acquisition by improper means or the disclosure, 
transfer or use of a trade or commercial secret without right or any legal 
justification, with the intent either to cause economic loss to the person entitled to 
the secret or to obtain an unlawful economic advantage for oneself or a third 
party; 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Use of a Computer’: The use of a computer system or network 
without right, that either: 
o is made with the acceptance of a significant risk of loss being caused to the 
person entitled to use the system or harm to the system or its functioning; 
o is made with the intent to cause loss to the person entitled the system or harm 
to the system or its functioning; or 
o causes loss to the person entitled to use the system or harm to the system or its 
functioning. 
 
• ‘Unauthorised Use of a Protected Computer Program’: The use without right of a 
computer program which is protected by law and which has been reproduced 
without right, with the intent, either to procure an unlawful economic gain for 
himself or for another person or to cause harm to the holder of the right.217 
 
2.2 The Recommendation No. R (95) 13 
 
On 11 September 1995, the COE adopted Recommendation No. R (95) 13 
Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedural Law Connected with Information 
Technology.218 The Committee of Ministers to Member States presented this 
Recommendation to guide states and their investigating agencies in the area of 
information technology by introducing 18 principles organised into seven chapters: 
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• Search and seizure 
• Technical surveillance 
• Obligations to co-operate with the investigating authorities 
• Electronic evidence 
• Use of encryption 
• Research; statistics and training 
• International co-operation219 
 
The document focus on these issues when investigating both cybercrime and 
traditional crimes with evidence found or transmitted in electronic form.220 
 
2.3 The Council of Europe’s European Committee on Crime Problems 
 
In 1997, the Council of Europe’s European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) 
set up a committee of experts (Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace) to deal 
with cybercrime.221 The Committee’s mandate was to examine laws criminalising 
cybercrime, to investigate and develop international co-operation regarding 
information technology, and to reach a common approach.222 The new committee was 
also assigned to draft ‘a binding legal instrument’ addressing these issues.223 
 
2.4 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on Crime in 
Cyberspace 
 
In April 1997, the Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace (PC-CY) started its 
work, preparing a Convention on Cybercrime.224 Preparing the Convention took four 
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years and 28 drafts before the final version, dated 25 May 2001, was submitted to the 
CDPC at its 50th Plenary Session on 18 to 22 June 2001.225 The final version contains 
a Preamble and four Chapters.226 
 
Chapter II includes measures to be taken at the national level in Section 1, 
‘substantive criminal law’ and Section 2, ‘procedural law’.227 The Draft Convention 
contains the Explanatory Memorandum which indicates that Section 1 aims to 
improve the means of preventing and suppressing computer or computer-related crime 
by establishing a common minimum standard of relevant offences, beneficial at the 
national and the international level.228 In fact, ‘[c]orrespondence in domestic law may 
prevent abuses from being shifted to a Party with a previous lower standard. As a 
consequence, the exchange of useful common experiences in the practical handling of 
cases may be enhanced, too.’229 Additionally, harmonisation facilitates international 
co-operation, especially extradition and mutual legal assistance, for instance, relating 
to double criminality requirements.230 
 
Parties to the Convention would agree to adopt legislation and other measures 
to criminalise certain computer-related activities under domestic law.231 Chapter II, 
sets out these activities in five titles: 
 
• illegal interception of and/or interference with computer data, illegal access to 
and/or interference with computer systems, and the misuse of devices to commit 
any of these offences; 
• computer-related forgery and fraud; 
• child pornography; 
• the infringement of copyright and related rights; and 
                                                                                                                                       
http://cryptome.org/cycime-final.html#DRAFT [Accessed 21 August 2006]. 
225
 See the ‘Council of Europe Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Convention on Cybercrime’ 
(hereinafter, ‘Explanatory Memorandum’) para 7-15. Available at  
http://cryptome.org/cycime-final.html#DRAFT%20REPORT [Accessed 6 March 2006]. 
226
 See the Final Activity Report note 224. 
227
 See the Final Activity Report (note 224) at Chap 1-33. 
228
 See the Explanatory Memorandum (note 225) para 7-15. 
229
 Goodman note 15. 
230
 See the Explanatory Memorandum (note 225) para 7-15. 
231
 See the Final Activity Report (note 224) at draft. 
  
41 
• provisions governing the imposition of aiding and abetting and corporate 
liability.232 
 
Parties also agree to establish ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
… sanctions’ for the commission of the particular offences.233 
 
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly approved the Draft 
Convention on Cybercrime at its April 2001 Plenary Session, and submitted it for 
approval to the CDPC at its June 2001 50th plenary session.234 On 8 November 2001, 
the Committee of Ministers adopted the Convention and its Explanatory Report at its 
109th Session and opened it for signature on 23 November 2001in Budapest, 
Hungary.235 
 
2.5 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty 
aimed at specifically addressing several categories of cybercrime.236 This Convention 
entered into force on 1 July 2004 and at present, 25 States have signed it (not followed 
by ratifications) and 18 have ratified it, legally committing themselves to be bound by 
it.237 This Convention is open for signature by the member States of the Council of 
                                               
232
 See the Explanatory Memorandum (note 225) para 35. 
233
 See the Final Activity Report (note 224) at 1 Title 5 Art 13. 
234
 The ‘Parliamentary Assembly-reactions and conclusions.’ Available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Themes/Cybercrime/e_assparl.asp [Accessed 21 August 2006]. 
235
 See the Convention note 166. 
236
 See the Preamble of the Convention note 166. 
237
 See the ‘Convention on Cybercrime CETS No.: 185.’ Available at 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=12&DF=1/17/2007&
CL=ENG [Accessed 17 January 2007]. At a signing ceremony on 23 November 2001, 26 member 
States of the Council of Europe and four observer States (that participated in the negotiations) signed 
the Convention. The 25 States that have signed the Convention are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Poland, 
Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom (member States of the 
Council of Europe) and Canada, Japan, Montenegro and South Africa (non-member States of the 
Council of Europe). The 18 ratifying States are: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, 
Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine (member States of the Council of 
Europe) and United States (non-member state of the Council of Europe), (status as of 17 January 2007). 
By signing the Convention Parties agree that they are not opposing it, and yet they are not undertaking 
to be bound by it. For the Convention to be binding Parties have to sign and ratify it, thus accepting the 
mandate to implement its provisions. This Convention commits Parties to effective and compatible 
  
42 
Europe and the non-member States which have participated in its negotiations and for 
accession by other non-member States.238 
 
The Convention seeks to pursue a ‘common criminal policy’ to combat 
cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international 
co-operation through: 
 
• harmonising domestic legislation; 
• adopting legislation facilitating the preserving and sharing of evidence; and 
• improving international co-operation to the ‘widest extent possible’ in 
investigating cybercrime.239 
 
The Convention contains four chapters.240 
 
2.5.1 The Chapters of the Convention 
 
The Convention deals particularly with violations of network security and 
interception, computer-related forgery and fraud, child pornography and 
infringements of copyright, organised as follows: 
 
• Use of terms 
This chapter defines computer data, computer system, service provider and traffic 
data.241 
 
• Measures to be taken at domestic level 
This chapter includes measures at the national level and covers three sections: 
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o Substantive criminal law 
This section defines nine criminal offences grouped in four categories of 
computer-related crimes: offences against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data and systems (illegal access, illegal interception, 
data interference, system interference and misuse of devices), computer-
related offences (computer-related forgery and fraud), content-related offences 
(offences related to child pornography) and offences related to infringements 
of copyright and related rights (copyright and related rights).242 
o Procedural law 
This section deals with the procedural aspects, and applies to any criminal 
offence committed through the use of computer systems and to the collection 
of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.243 The procedures include 
the expedited preservation of stored computer data and electronic 
communications (traffic data), production orders, search and seizure of stored 
computer data, and real-time collection of computer data.244 
o Jurisdiction 
This section addresses the issue of jurisdiction to determine where the offence 
was committed and which law must accordingly apply.245 Parties must enact 
legislation to establish jurisdiction relating to offences committed on their 
territories, on registered ships or aircraft or by their nationals abroad.246 
 
• International co-operation 
This chapter establishes a rapid and effective system for international co-operation 
and has two sections: 
o General provisions 
The general provisions include principles relating to mutual assistance, and 
procedures on mutual assistance requests in the absence of international 
agreements. The Convention permits law enforcement in one country to 
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collect computer-based evidence for the law enforcement in another country 
and deems cybercrimes to be extraditable offences.247 
o Specific provisions 
The special provisions relate to mutual assistance regarding provisional 
measures, and to mutual assistance for accessing data, and call for establishing 
a 24-hour seven-days-a-week contact network to facilitate ‘immediate 
assistance’ in ‘investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences 
related to computer systems and data or for the collection of evidence in 
electronic form of a criminal offence.’248 
 
• Final clauses 
The last chapter comprises the final clauses which in limited respects are similar 
to the standard provisions in the Council of Europe treaties. According to Article 
40 any State may declare that it avails itself of the possibility of requiring 
additional elements as provided for in some articles. Likewise, according to 
Article 42, any State may declare that it avails itself of the reservations as 
provided for in some articles.249 
 
An additional protocol, addressing acts of a racist and xenophobic nature 
committed through computer systems, supplements the Council of Europe Convention 
on Cybercrime.250 
 
2.6 The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning 
the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed 
through Computer Systems 
 
The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime defines racist or 
xenophobic acts committed through computer networks and makes their publication a 
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criminal offence.251 This additional protocol was negotiated in the late 2001 and early 
2002, and on 7 November 2002 the Committee of Ministers adopted it.252 This 
protocol was opened for signature on 28 January 2003 and is open for signature by the 
States which have signed the Convention on Cybercrime ETS 185.253 The protocol 
entered into force on 1 January 2006 and presently 21 States have signed it (not 
followed by ratifications) and 10 have ratified it.254 
 
The protocol is separate from the main Convention; it does not bind a country 
that signed and ratified the Convention but not the protocol.255 
 
3. The United Nations 
 
The UN is an international organisation of 192 members.256 It seeks to: 
 
• practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours; 
 
• unite [our] strength to maintain international peace and security; 
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• ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest; and 
 
• employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples.257 
 
The UN has long been a leader in addressing global issues and has engaged in 
multiple efforts relating to cybercrime.258 Various bodies within the UN have initiated 
significant research and negotiations to reach a consensus on a number of cyberspace 
issues, including setting standards on providing security for networks, and 
establishing a forum on challenging issues, such as spam and information security.259 
 
3.1 The UN Crime Congresses 
 
In 1990, the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders addressed the legal challenges of cybercrime.260 The Congress produced a 
resolution calling for Member States to intensify efforts in combating computer crime, 
by improving computer security and preventive measures, and promoting the 
development of a comprehensive international framework of guidelines and standards 
addressing future computer-related crimes.261 Most particularly, the resolution calls 
for Member States to intensify efforts in modernising national criminal laws and 
procedures, including measures to: 
 
• ensure that existing offences and laws concerning investigative powers and 
admissibility of evidence in judicial proceedings adequately apply and, if 
necessary, make appropriate changes; 
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• in the absence of laws that adequately apply, create offences and investigative and 
evidentiary procedures, where necessary, to deal with this novel and sophisticated 
form of criminal activity; and 
 
• provide for the forfeiture or restitution of illegally acquired assets resulting from 
the commission of computer-related crimes.262 
 
In April 2005, the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice reaffirmed the fundamental importance of implementing existing 
instruments.263 Further, the Congress reaffirmed developing national measures in 
criminal matters, such as considering the strengthening and augmenting of measures 
particularly against cybercrime (among others), as well as extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and confiscating, recovering and returning crime proceeds.264 Also, the 
Congress urged the Members to continue co-operating in combating crime and 
seeking justice.265 
 
3.2 The UN General Assembly 
 
In 1990, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly prepared a resolution 
inviting governments to be guided by the resolutions adopted at the Eighth UN 
Congress in formulating appropriate legislation and policy directives.266 The General 
Assembly adopted this resolution on 14 December 1990.267 
 
The First, Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly have also 
passed several resolutions dealing with cyberspace issues. Among these the most 
relevant are: 
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• Resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998, 54/49 of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of 20 
November 2000, 56/19 of 29 November 2001, 57/53 of 22 November 2002 and 
58/32 of 18 December 2003 on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.268 These resolutions 
address concerns that information technology could be used for purposes 
inconsistent with the goals and principles of the UN. Thus, the resolutions call on 
States to promote the multi-lateral consideration of existing and potential threats 
in the field, as well as possible measures limiting the emerging threats.269 
 
• Resolutions 55/63 of 4 December 2000, and 56/121 of 19 December 2001 on 
Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technology.270 These resolutions 
address different ways in which States could combat the criminal misuse of 
information technologies.271 The resolutions urge States to enhance coordination 
and co-operation in combating the criminal misuse of information technologies.272 
Further, the resolutions note other efforts towards combating these crimes and also 
note measures adopted to combat these crimes, including, inter alia: 
o coordinated law enforcement cooperation in investigating and prosecuting the 
criminal misuse of information technologies; 
o legal systems protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data 
and computer systems from unauthorised impairment and ensuring the 
penalisation of criminal abuse; 
o legal systems permitting the preservation of and quick access to electronic data 
in investigating particular cases; and 
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o training and equipping law enforcement to address the criminal misuse of 
information technologies.273 
 
• Resolution 57/239 of 20 December 2002 on Creation of a Global Culture of 
Cybersecurity.274 This resolution deals with changes in cultural perceptions for 
achieving greater information and network security; stressing the need for 
cybersecurity measures and urges States to fulfil nine complementary principles 
domestically, namely: 
o Awareness 
o Responsibility 
o Response 
o Ethics 
o Democracy 
o Risk assessment 
o Security design and implementation 
o Security management 
o Reassessment275 
 
• Resolution 58/199 of 23 December 2003 on Creation of a Global Culture of 
Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures.276 This 
resolution also deals with changes in cultural perceptions for achieving greater 
information and network security.277 The resolution notes the interdependence of 
information infrastructures with other sectors of the global infrastructure that are 
critical for public services, and encourages States to develop protective strategies 
for critical infrastructures.278 The Annex to this resolution provides 11 ways in 
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which States can provide greater protection to critical information 
infrastructures.279 
 
3.3 The UN Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related 
Crime 
 
In 1994, the UN Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime 
was published.280 The Manual examines the phenomenon of computer crime, 
substantive criminal law protecting the holder of data and information, substantive 
criminal law protecting privacy, human rights, procedural law, crime prevention in the 
computer environment, and the need for developing international co-operation.281 
 
4. The European Union 
 
The EU is a supranational organisation of 25 independent states of the European 
Communities dedicated to enhancing political, economic and social co-operation.282 
 
In 1996 and 1997, the European Commission issued several documents on 
harmful and illegal content online and on the safe use of the Internet.283 On 24 April 
1997, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the European Commission’s 
communication on illegal and harmful content on the Internet, supporting the 
Commission’s initiatives and stressing the need for international co-operation in 
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different initiated areas.284 Further, in April 1998, the European Commission 
presented the European Council with a report on computer-related crime which it had 
commissioned.285 
 
In June 2000, the Feira Summit of the European Council adopted the European 
Commission and European Council’s Action Plan.286 Among other things, the Action 
Plan calls for establishing a co-ordinated and coherent approach to cybercrime by the 
end of 2002.287 A Commission report issued subsequently explains that the EU had 
planned approximating substantive criminal law in the area of computer-related crime 
since October, 1999.288 The report notes that the Commission has been observing the 
Council of Europe’s work on the Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime.289 Also, it 
explains that the European Union’s plan on approximating substantive cybercrime law 
could go beyond the C.O.E Convention, representing a minimum of international 
cooperation, could operate sooner and would bring computer crime in line with EU 
law, introducing EU law enforcement mechanisms.290 Further, this portion of the 
report announces that the European Commission plans to propose: 
 
• Combating child pornography online.291 
 
• Approximating hacking and denial of service attacks, and standardising 
definitions for the EU, to ensure that serious cases are punishable by a minimum 
penalty in all Member States.292 
 
• Acting against racism and xenophobia on the Internet.293 
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• Considering improving effective efforts against the illicit drugs trade on the 
Internet.294 
 
On 19 April 2002, the Commission of the European Communities presented a 
proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems.295 
The Council of Europe adopted the proposal on 27 February 2003.296 The Framework 
Decision incorporates illegal access to information systems, illegal system 
interference and illegal data interference.297 
 
5. The Group of Eight 
 
The G-8 is a multilateral group consisting of eight of the world’s major industrial 
countries meeting annually to discuss major economic, political and security issues.298 
In 1995, the G-8 formed a group (later called the Lyon Group) to address 
transnational crime.299 In 1996, this group produced 40 Recommendations to combat 
transnational organised crime that the G-8 endorsed in June 1996.300 Thereafter, the 
G-8 created the Subgroup of High-Tech crime, among the five ‘Subgroups’ created to 
address specific crime related issues.301 This Subgroup began its work by enhancing 
the G-8’s abilities in preventing, investigating and prosecuting computer related 
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299
 See the Meeting of G-8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers Washington background on G8 note 
298. 
300
 See ibid. Among others, the Lyon Group recommends members to review their laws to ensure 
criminalising abuses of modern technology. 
301
 See ibid. 
  
53 
crimes.302 In 1997, the G-8 meeting in Washington D.C. adopted ten Principles and an 
Action Plan to combat high-tech crimes, and further pledged to review their laws in 
order to criminalise and prosecute these crimes, (among other things).303 
 
5.1 The G-8 Principles 
 
The principles adopted to ensure that no country provides ‘safe havens’ are that: 
 
• There must be no safe havens for those who abuse information technologies. 
 
• Investigation and prosecution of international high-tech crimes must be 
coordinated among all concerned States, regardless of where [the] harm has 
occurred. 
 
• Law enforcement personnel must be trained and equipped to address high-tech 
crimes. 
 
• Legal systems must protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data 
and systems from unauthorized impairment and ensure that serious abuse is 
penalised. 
 
• Legal systems should permit the preservation of and quick access to electronic 
data, which are often critical to the successful investigation of crime. 
 
• Mutual assistance regimes must ensure the timely gathering and exchange of 
evidence in cases involving international high-tech crime. 
 
• Transborder electronic access by law enforcement to publicly available (open 
source) information does not require authorisation from the State where the data 
resides. 
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• Forensic standards for retrieving and authenticating electronic data for use in 
criminal investigations and prosecutions must be developed and employed. 
 
• To the extent practicable, information and telecommunications systems should be 
designed to help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate the 
tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence. 
 
• Work in this area should be coordinated with the work of other relevant 
international fora to ensure against [the] duplication of efforts.304 
 
In May 2000, the G-8 held a cybercrime conference discussing how to jointly 
tackle Internet crime.305 Bringing together about 300 judges, police personnel, 
diplomats and business leaders from the G-8 countries, the conference drafted an 
agenda for a follow-up summit to be held in July.306 At the July 2000 summit, the G-8 
issued a communiqué, declaring that it would ‘take a concerted approach to high-tech 
crime, such as cybercrime, which could seriously threaten security and confidence in 
the global information society.’307 The communiqué noted that the G-8’s approach to 
these matters was outlined in paragraph eight of the Okinawa Charter on Global 
Information Society: 
 
International efforts to develop a global information society must be accompanied by co-
ordinated action to foster a crime-free and secure cyberspace. We must ensure that effective 
measures, as set out in the OECD Guidelines for Security of Information Systems, are put in 
place to fight cyber-crime. G-8 co-operation within the framework of the Lyon Group on 
Transnational Organised Crime will be enhanced. We will further promote dialogue with 
industry building on the success of the recent G8 Paris Conference…. Urgent security issues 
such as hacking and viruses also require effective policy responses. We will continue to 
engage industry and other stakeholders to protect critical information infrastructures.308 
 
Additionally, the G-8 pledged establishing a ‘Digital Opportunity Taskforce’ 
which would explore integrating the G-8 members’ efforts into ‘a broader 
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international approach’.309 The Taskforce held meetings during late 2000 and early 
2001 and submitted a report containing their Proposed Plan of Action to the personal 
representatives of the G-8 leaders in May 2001.310 However, the report did not address 
cybercrime, but focused instead on the need to overcome the ‘digital divide.’311 
 
In May 2003, the G-8 adopted Principles for Protecting Critical Information 
Infrastructures, encouraging counties to consider them in developing a strategy for 
reducing risks to critical information infrastructures: 
 
• Countries should have emergency warning networks regarding cyber 
vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents. 
 
• Countries should raise awareness to facilitate stakeholders’ understanding of the 
nature and extent of their critical information infrastructures, and the role each 
must play in protecting them. 
 
• Countries should examine their infrastructures and identify interdependencies 
among them, thereby enhancing protection of such infrastructures. 
 
• Countries should promote partnerships among stakeholders, both public and 
private, to share and analyze critical infrastructure information in order to prevent, 
investigate, and respond to damage to or attacks on such infrastructures. 
 
• Countries should create and maintain crisis communication networks and test 
them to ensure that they will remain secure and stable in emergency situations. 
 
• Countries should ensure that data availability policies take into account the need 
to protect critical information infrastructures. 
 
• Countries should facilitate tracing attacks on critical information infrastructures 
and, where appropriate, the disclosure of tracing information to other countries. 
                                               
309
 See ibid. 
310
 See Goodman note 15. 
311
 See ibid. 
  
56 
• Countries should conduct training and exercises to enhance their response 
capabilities and to test continuity and contingency plans in the event of an 
information infrastructure attack and should encourage stakeholders to engage in 
similar activities. 
 
• Countries should ensure that they have adequate substantive and procedural laws, 
such as those outlined in the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention of 23 
November 2001, and trained personnel to enable them to investigate and prosecute 
attacks on critical information infrastructures, and to coordinate such 
investigations with other countries as appropriate. 
 
• Countries should engage in international cooperation, when appropriate, to secure 
critical information infrastructures, including by developing and coordinating 
emergency warning systems, sharing and analysing information regarding 
vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents, and coordinating investigations of attacks on 
such infrastructures in accordance with domestic laws. 
 
• Countries should promote national and international research and development 
and encourage the application of security technologies that are certified according 
to international standards.312 
 
On 11 May 2004, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers and the European 
Commissioner met in Washington D.C., to discuss combating cybercrime and 
enhancing cybercrime investigations, among other things.313 Closing this meeting the 
Ministers issued a joint communiqué stating that with the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime coming into force, the States must encourage the broad 
adoption of the Convention’s legal standards.314 In June 2005, the Justice and Home 
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Affairs Ministers meeting in Sheffield discussed international co-operation in 
combating high-tech crime, among other things.315 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Except for the Convention on Cybercrime, the above initiatives are not binding on 
countries; they merely provide guidance for an effective framework capable of 
addressing cybercrime. Therefore, Lesotho can intelligently borrow from these 
initiatives to enact a comprehensive legal structure to combat cybercrime. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS ON 
CYBERCRIME 
 
Overview 
 
Many nations have adopted legislation dealing with all or at least some aspects of 
cybercrime. These are mainly developed countries; relatively few developing 
countries have done so. A study published in December 2000 found that of the 52 
countries surveyed to determine the state of cybercrime security laws, 33 had not 
updated their laws to address any type of cybercrime. Nine countries had partially 
updated theirs, addressing five or fewer types of cybercrime, while the remaining ten 
had updated their laws on six or more types of cybercrime.316 McConnell International 
illustrates the laws that have been updated in each of the 19 countries with fully, 
substantially, or partially updated laws in place thus: 
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 McConnell International note 1. 
No Updated Laws (33): Albania, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
France, Gambia, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malta, 
Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Romania, South Africa, Sudan, Vietnam, 
Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Partially Updated Laws (9): Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malaysia, Poland, Spain, 
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Substantially or Fully Updated Laws (10): Australia, Canada, Estonia, India, Japan, Mauritius, Peru, 
Philippines, Turkey, and United States. 
McConnell International divides cybercrime into four categories, with ten types of the crime, as 
follows: 
• Data Crimes: data interception, data modification and data theft. 
• Network Crimes: network interference and network sabotage. 
• Access Crimes: unauthorized access and virus dissemination. 
• Related Crimes: aiding and abetting cyber crimes, computer-related forgery and computer-related 
fraud. 
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Figure 1:  Countries with Updated Laws 
Countries with Updated Laws 
 Data Crimes NetworkCrimes Access Crimes Related Crimes 
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McConnell International also provides a key for Figure 1: 
 
 
Key for Figure 1 
Data Interception: Interception of data in transmission. 
Data Modification: Alteration, destruction, or erasing of data. 
Data Theft: Taking or coping data, regardless of whether it is protected by other laws, e.g., copyright, privacy, etc. 
Network Interference: Impeding or preventing access for others. The most common example of this action is instigating a 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, flooding Web sites or Internet Service Providers. DDOS attacks are often launched 
from numerous computers that have been hacked to obey commands of the perpetrator. 
Network Sabotage: Modification or destruction of a network or system. 
Unauthorized Access: Hacking or cracking to gain access to a system or data. 
Virus Dissemination: Introduction of software damaging to systems or data. 
Aiding and Abetting: Enabling the commission of a cybercrime. 
Computer-Related Forgery: Alteration of data with intent to represent as authentic. 
Computer-Related Fraud: Alteration of data with intent to derive economic benefit from its misrepresentation. 
317
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This chapter reflects some countries’ progress in reforming their legal systems 
to specifically incorporate cybercrime. It does not attempt to analyse the extent to 
which those countries’ penal legislation can be applied to prosecute those using 
computer technology to commit conventional offences such as theft, fraud and 
forgery. This chapter discusses the relevant legislation in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and South Africa.318 
 
1. The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom’s centrepiece cybercrime legislation is set out in the Computer 
Misuse Act of 1990 (c. 18). The Act came into effect in 1990 following the leading 
English case involving computers, R v Gold [1987] 3 WLR 803. Further, the United 
Kingdom regulates other cybercrimes through the Protection of Children Act of 1978 
(c 37) (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 (c. 33) and 
the Sexual Offences Act of 2003 (c. 42)) and the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
of 1988 (c. 48). 
 
1.1 R v Gold 
 
In this case, the defendants, Robert Schifreen and Stephen Gold, using a conventional 
home computer and a modem in late 1984 and early 1985, gained unauthorised access 
to British Telecom’s (BT) Prestel interactive viewdata service. According to Higney, 
‘[i]t had all started so innocently, with Robert fooling around on his computer back in 
1985. ‘I never set out to be a hacker, I was testing a home micro computer at a time 
looking into systems when I stumbled upon a correct password that wasn’t mine,’ he 
[Robert] explains.’319 The BT Prestel system recognised the defendants as legitimate 
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users and suddenly allowed them into its computer systems, and the two obtained 
passwords of various people in the Prestel organisation. The defendants were arrested 
and prosecuted under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of 1981, for defrauding BT 
by creating a ‘false instrument’, as they entered the customer’s authorisation code to 
access the system.320 The Southwark Crown Court found the defendants guilty. 
 
 The defendants appealed to the High Court on the grounds of lack of evidence 
showing the two had attempted to derive material benefit from their exploits, and on 
the grounds that the Forgery Act had been misapplied to their conduct. Lord Justice 
Jane acquitted the defendants, but the prosecution then appealed against that decision 
to the House of Lords. However, the Law Lords affirmed the acquittal, deciding that 
the appellants ‘had committed no offence under any legislation at that time.’ Lord 
Brandon ruled: 
 
We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the language of the Act was not intended to 
apply to the situation which was shown to exist in this case. The submissions at the close of 
the prosecution case should have succeeded. It is a conclusion which we reach without regret. 
The Procrustean attempt to force facts into the language of an Act not designed to fit them 
produced grave difficulties for both judge and jury which we would not wish to see repeated. 
The appellants’ conduct amounted in essence, as already stated, to dishonestly gaining access 
to the relevant Prestel data bank by a trick. That is not a criminal offence. If it is thought 
desirable to make it so, that is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.321 
 
As the law then stood, hacking was not a criminal offence. Thus this case set 
in motion the reform of the criminal law to avoid having to bend traditional 
interpretations to fit cybercrime.322 
 
1.2 The Computer Misuse Act 
 
The Act creates three criminal offences: 
 
• Unauthorised access to computer material 
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• Unauthorised access to a computer system with intent to commit or facilitate the 
commission of a further offence 
 
• Unauthorised modification of computer material 
 
1.2.1 Unauthorised access to computer material 
 
This section prohibits intentionally causing a computer to perform any function to 
access a computing system without any authority.323 Consequently, hacking becomes 
criminal regardless of where the hacker operates; locally or long distance over the 
remote area networks. As such, employees or students with limited authorisation to 
use their computers but knowingly exceed that authority commit an offence. For 
instance, without proper authority, the act criminalises: 
 
• using another’s identifier (ID) and password to access a computer, using data or 
running a program; 
 
• altering, deleting, coping or moving a program or data, or merely outputting a 
program or data to a screen or printer; 
 
• laying a trap to obtain a password; or  
 
• impersonating another person using e-mail, online chat, web, or other services.324 
 
The offence is committed when unauthorised access is achieved, and it is 
punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding 2,000 Pounds, or six 
months’ imprisonment, or both.325 
                                               
323
 See the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 (c. 18) s 1. Available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900018_en_1.htm [Accessed 17 November 2006]. 
The intent to commit this offence need not be directed at any specific computing system. The Act does 
not attempt to define ‘computer’, though it does define ‘access.’ 
324
 The ‘University of Liverpool ‘The Computer Misuse Act 1990.’ Available at 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/Regulations/Commisus.html. [Accessed 17 November 2006]. 
325
 Access is achieved by merely inducing ‘a computer to perform any function’ with intent to secure 
access, without proper authority. See also the Computer Misuse Act s 1(3). 
  
63 
1.2.2 Unauthorised access to a computer system with intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of a further offence 
 
This section proscribes gaining unauthorised access with the specific intention to 
commit or facilitate committing a further offence.326 For example, a person who 
illegally accesses a computer using another person’s ID to copy legally protected 
material commits an offence. In R v Farquharson,327 the defendant was prosecuted for 
obtaining mobile telephone numbers and codes for producing cloned telephones. 
Actually, Farquharson’s co-defendant Ms. Pearce, an employee of the mobile 
telephone company, had accessed the computing system that contained the 
information. Pearce was also charged with the s.1 offence.328 The court found that 
Farquharson had gained ‘unauthorised access’ merely by asking Pearce to obtain the 
information, despite never touching the computer himself. 
 
The offence is committed as soon as the perpetrator obtains specific access for 
criminal purposes. Upon conviction, a person is liable to imprisonment for up to five 
years, or a fine, or both.329 
 
1.2.3 Unauthorised modification of computer material 
 
This offence criminalises the unauthorised modifying of computer material.330 This 
entails deliberately deleting or corrupting programs or data. It also covers introducing 
viruses, worms and others, which result in modifying or destroying data. Typically, 
criminal modifications occur by: 
 
• using a trojan horse to obtain identity data or to acquire any data from an 
unauthorised source;331 
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• modifying the operating system files or some aspect of the computer’s functions 
to interfere with its operation or to prevent access to any data, including the 
destruction of files; or  
 
• deliberately generating code to cause a complete system malfunction. 
 
 This offence specifically targets those writing and circulating a computer virus 
or worm, whether operating locally or across networks.332 Conviction is punishable by 
imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both.333 
 
1.3 The Protection of Children Act 
 
This Act regulates child pornography by criminalising taking, permitting to be taken 
or making, distributing or showing, possessing, publishing or causing to be published 
any indecent photograph or indecent pseudo-photograph of a child, including by 
electronic and other means capable of converting into a photograph.334 The 
punishment for this offence is imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or a 
fine, or both.335 
 
1.4 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
 
This law criminalises copyright infringement for unlawfully making for selling or 
hiring, selling, hiring, importing, possessing, offering for selling or hiring, publicly 
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exhibiting, distributing or copying copyright.336 Under this law copyright also 
includes a computer program.337 Criminal liability attaches when: 
 
• infringing a copyright; 
• acting without the licence of the copyright owner; and  
• committed for commercial purposes.338 
 
 Conviction is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years, or a 
fine, or both.339 
 
1.5 Concerns 
 
Since coming into effect the Computer Misuse Act has been successfully applied 
against the various offences that it was targeting.340 However, concerns do exist over 
its wording and its adequacy in fully protecting both systems and data (and yet not 
restricting the growth of the domestic information technology industry). Concerns 
include: 
 
• The Act does not define ‘computer’ potentially incorporating household 
appliances and cars using computer technology.341 Nonetheless, the Law 
Commission recognised that attempting to define ‘computer’ would be ‘so 
complex, in an endeavour to be all-embracing, that they are likely to produce 
extensive argument.’342 Other jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, also 
adopt this approach while the United States takes exception to this and defines 
‘computer’.343 
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• Section 1’s is broadly formulated and requires intent to secure access by causing 
‘a computer to perform any function.’ This generally means that by merely 
interacting with a computer without authorisation, even without specifically and 
actually accessing any program or data, a person commits an offence.344 This 
outlaws all versions of hacking that are designed to crack the security in operating 
systems, despite the fact that no harm is intended or regardless of the motive. 
Even mere curiosity or responding to a security system seen as a challenge 
amounts to a criminal offence.345 Robert Schifreen mourns the loss of the 
‘gentleman hacker’–‘the hobbyist’ without malice, and further notes that illegal 
hackers seeking to damage people and organisations have replaced the ‘social 
hackers.’346 Additionally, Schifreen observes that ‘[t]here are very good hackers 
out there, Kevin Mitnick, for example, but it is a great waste of their talent. Other 
people that call themselves hackers simply download programmes or are social 
engineers. They are not true hackers.’347 Evidently, however, Schifreen neglected 
to reflect on hacking as an invasion of privacy and the sense of insecurity felt by 
the victims. 
 
• The Act needs to be revised as it does not take account of the Internet and does not 
incorporate offences such as data interception or denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
The Act does not clearly indicate whether DoS attacks are an offence, creating 
uncertainty about this grey area and therefore requiring clarity. 
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The United Kingdom recently amended the Computer Misuse Act with the 
Police and Justice Act of 2006 (c. 48). The Act was promulgated on 8 November 
2006. 
 
1.6 The Police and Justice Act 
 
The Police and Justice Act introduces the following amendments: 
 
• Increased penalty ect for offence of unauthorised access to computer material 
• Unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer, etc 
• Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences 
• Transitional and saving provision 
 
1.6.1 Increased penalty ect for offence of unauthorised access to computer 
material 
 
This section increases the term of imprisonment for hacking into computers from five 
years to ten years.348 
 
1.6.2 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer, etc 
 
This section intends to make DoS attacks illegal.349 As the old law did not clearly 
indicate whether DoS attacks were an offence, this new section clarifies this issue and 
specifically indicates that they are an offence. The need for amending this law became 
apparent when a court threw out the case of a teenager charged for breaching anti-
hacking laws by sending five million emails to his former employer. Certainly, the old 
law had some flaws, ‘…judges at the Royal Courts of Justice sent the case back to the 
Magistrates Court, saying Judge Grant was not right to state that there was no case to 
                                               
348
 See the Police and Justice Act of 2006 (c. 48) s 35. Available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/20060048.htm [Accessed 17 November 2006]. 
349
 See the Police and Justice Act s 36. 
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answer.’350 Admittedly, the old law was enacted 16 years ago before cybercrime 
became a significant problem. 
 
This section replaces section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act.351 
 
1.6.3 Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences 
 
This section outlaws developing, owning and distributing ‘hacker tools’ for criminal 
use.352 This also covers distributing these tools believing that they are ‘likely to be 
used’ criminally.353 Although this section allows security personnel to have methods 
of testing the security of systems (as it does not outlaw developing, owning and 
distributing the tools for legitimate use) it fails to recognise ‘dual-use’ software that 
could be used both legitimately and criminally.354 This is of concern as those 
distributing these tools (and believing that they are likely to be used criminally) are 
criminally liable. Despite perhaps being badly drafted, the section objectively seeks to 
hinder the growing trend in producing and distributing tools more commonly intended 
to support cybercrimes, and not the legitimate tools. 
 
The majority views this section as ‘a bad piece of legislation’ that must be 
removed. Thus for example, some write, ‘[a]s far as I can see, this looks a complete 
dog’s breakfast of a clause as it fails to consider that many so-called “hacker tools” 
have perfectly legitimate uses.’355 Additionally, others stress that: 
 
With Blears’ amendment we’ve actually gone from a position where a sizeable proportion of 
a[n] good system administrator’s ‘toolkit’ could be illegal under this new law to one where it 
almost certainly will be illegal …. Substandard doesn’t come close to describing the 
Committee’s handling of this matter.356 
 
                                               
350
 David Meyer ‘Email bomber faces retrial’ ZDNET UK 11 (May 2006). Available at 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39268334,00.htm [Accessed 17 November 2006]. 
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 See the Police and Justice Act s 36. 
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 See the Police and Justice Act s 37. 
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Lord Northesk, a Conservative peer, believes this amendment ‘will potentially 
create a situation where the police would have to prosecute themselves’ and further 
maintains: 
 
Bodies like the Serious and Organised Crime Unit (SOCA) need to do forensic hacking as part 
of their investigations. If they are creating hacking tools they know full well they’ll be used 
for hacking, I will definitely be seeking to change it. The Home Office is in enough trouble 
already, so the thought of them enacting a law to stop the police doing their job is 
extraordinary.357 
 
 Lord Northesk tried unsuccessfully to amend this section, by proposing to 
remove the paragraph that makes publicly available computer tools likely to be used 
in a computer offence an offence.358 
 
 This section inserts a new section 3A into the Computer Misuse Act.359 
 
1.6.4 Transitional and saving provision 
 
This section creates transitional amendments for the Act’s provisions amending the 
Computer Misuse Act to provide that the amendments do not apply regarding 
offences committed before the amendments’ coming into force or acts done before 
then.360 
 
 Undeniably, this section poses a problem as it does not address the issue of 
‘attacks, probes, etc’ that started before this Act commenced, and still continue. 
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 Tom Espiner ‘Lord vows to fight cybercrime laws’ available at 
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1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Despite the efforts to reform the Computer Misuse Act, perhaps having a whole Bill 
devoted to amending the old law would better serve the United Kingdom, rather than 
having only three amendments tagged on to the much larger Police and Justice Act.361 
 
2. The United States 
 
The United States has adopted cybercrime legislation at both the state and federal 
levels. The study below concentrates on federal legislation, both for its more general 
applicability and because attempting to discuss legislation adopted by the fifty states 
is quite beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The United States prosecutes computer-related crimes under: 
 
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Section 1030 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code of 1986 (as amended in 1994, 1996 and in 2001 by the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001). 
 
• The Stored Communications Act of 1986 Section 2701 of Title 18 of the United 
States Code. 
 
• The Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Access-Devices Section 1029 
of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
 
• The Use of Interstate Facilities to Transmit Information about a Minor Section 
2425 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
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 The United Kingdom waited for 16 years to amend this law, and somehow three amendments seem 
inadequate. The Police and Justice Act contains a total of 55 sections. 
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• The Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 Section 223 of Title 47 of the 
United States Code. 
 
• The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998 Section 231 of Title 47 of the 
United States Code. 
 
• The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, Section 506 of Title 17 of the United 
States Code. 
 
• The criminal infringement of a copyright Section 2319 of Title 18 of the United 
States Code. 
 
2.1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 
The United States first enacted this law in 1986 and revised it in 1994, 1996 and in 
2001 with the USA PATRIOT Act. This law intends to reduce hacking of computer 
systems by criminalising activities designed to access a federal or ‘protected 
computer.’362 Criminal offences under this Act include: 
 
• Knowingly accessing an unauthorised computer and obtaining national security 
data. 
 
• Intentionally accessing an unauthorised computer and obtaining information from 
any protected computer. 
 
• Intentionally accessing any unauthorised government computer and affecting the 
government’s use of the computer. 
                                               
362
 See the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 18 USC § 1030. Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_new.html [Accessed 23 November 2006]. The Act 
defines a ‘protected computer’ as: 
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• Knowingly accessing an unauthorised protected computer intending to defraud 
and obtaining anything of value. 
 
• Knowingly transmitting a program, information, code or command and damaging 
an unauthorised protected computer, intentionally accessing an unauthorised 
protected computer and recklessly or otherwise causing damage. 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud, trafficking in any password or similar 
information through which a computer may be accessed without authorisation. 
 
• Transmitting in commerce any communication containing any threat to damage a 
protected computer, intentionally to extort money or other valuables. 
 
Conviction for any offence is a fine or imprisonment for not more than ten 
years, or both, or a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years, or both, for a 
subsequent conviction for another offence or its attempt.363 
 
2.1.1 Knowingly accessing an unauthorised computer and obtaining national 
security data 
 
This section criminalises deliberately breaking into a computer to obtain restricted 
information or attempting to do so.364 It requires proof that a person used an 
unauthorised computer or exceeded the authority, for obtaining restricted data and 
thus performed some unauthorised communication or other improper act. The section 
prohibits the use of a computer, not the unauthorised possession or the subsequent 
transmission of the information.365 As the United States Department of Justice 
indicates, ‘[e]xisting espionage laws would provide an adequate basis for the 
prosecution of individuals who attempt to peddle governmental secrets to foreign 
governments.’366 
                                               
363
 See 18 USC § 1030(c)(1)(A) and (B). 
364
 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(1). 
365
 See the U.S. Department of Justice ‘The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section the 
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 legislative analysis.’ Available at 
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2.1.2 Intentionally accessing an unauthorised computer and obtaining 
information from any protected computer 
 
This section punishes computer misuse intended to obtain information from any 
protected computer.367 Essentially, it is designed to protect the confidentiality of 
computer data. This covers information obtained from: 
 
• the finance authorities’ financial records; 
• the Government; or 
• any protected computer if the conduct involves an interstate or foreign 
communication.368 
 
The section does not merely punish the acquisition of information but proscribes 
intentionally accessing a computer without or exceeding the authority and 
subsequently obtaining information. More simply, if the information is available it 
must be obtained legally and not through hacking.369 
 
2.1.3 Intentionally accessing any unauthorised government computer and 
affecting the government’s use of the computer 
 
This section prohibits accessing an authorised government computer, exclusively or 
non-exclusively used, when such access affects the government’s use of the 
computer.370 It protects a full-time or part-time government computer from outsiders 
regardless of whether the latter obtains any information.371 A person not authorised to 
access any non-public government computer violates the integrity of a government 
computer by gaining unauthorised access and thus commits an offence even when not 
jeopardising the confidentiality of data. Simply put, any unauthorised access violates 
this law, even if this access is not damaging or no property is stolen. However, if the 
                                               
367
 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(2). 
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government uses the computer part-time, the prosecution must show that the 
criminal’s conduct affected the government’s use of the computer.372 
 
2.1.4 Knowingly accessing an unauthorised protected computer intending to 
defraud and obtaining anything of value 
 
This section proscribes knowingly accessing a ‘protected computer’ without or 
exceeding authorised use, with the intention to defraud, and by such conduct 
furthering the intended fraud and obtaining anything of value.373 It punishes those 
who use computers in schemes to defraud victims of property. This fraud provision 
excludes cases involving less than $5,000 of computer use in a year.374 The term 
‘protected computer’ is significant as it also covers private entities, thus protecting 
them from this criminal conduct.375 For instance, North Bay Health Care Group 
(North Bay), a non-profit making organisation, brought ten counts of charges against 
Jessica Quitugua Sabathia, an accounts payable clerk for fraudulently using her 
computer to embezzle more than $875, 035. Between July 2001 and April 2004, 
Sabathia used her computer to access North Bay’s accounting software. Unauthorised, 
Sabathia issued approximately 127 checks payable to herself and others. Concealing 
the fraud, Sabathia altered the electronic check register making it appear as if the 
checks had been payable to the organisation’s vendors. Sabathia cashed several 
checks, deposited some into her bank account and some into others’ bank accounts 
and also used some for personal expenses. Sabathia faces a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment, and up to a $250,000 fine for each count of the computer fraud, if 
convicted.376 
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2006]. North Bay operates hospitals and clinics in Vacaville and Fairfield, California. See also 
‘Woman hacks North Bay Health Care Group.’ Available at http://www.crime-
research.org/news/10.06.2004/419 [Accessed 23 November 2006]. 
  
75 
2.1.5 Knowingly transmitting a program, information, code, or command and 
intentionally causing damage to an unauthorised protected computer, 
intentionally accessing an unauthorised protected computer and recklessly or 
otherwise causing damage 
 
This section seeks to punish anyone intending to cause damage without authority, 
whether an outsider or an insider.377 It creates three offences, two felonies and one 
misdemeanour, based on the intent and the authority of the wrongdoer. Knowingly 
transmitting a program, information, code, or command and intentionally causing 
damage to an unauthorised protected computer amounts to a felony.378 Similarly, 
intentionally accessing an unauthorised protected computer and recklessly causing 
damage is a felony.379 Intentionally accessing an unauthorised protected computer and 
incidentally causing damage amounts to a misdemeanour, as the damage caused is not 
intentional or reckless.380 This section broadly defines damage as including any 
impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system or information 
resulting in: 
 
• loss to one or more during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000 in 
value; 
• modifying or impairing or potentially modifying or impairing any medical record 
of one or more individuals; 
• physical injury to any person; 
• a threat to public health or safety; or 
• damage affecting a government computer system.381 
 
A leading case of a hacker prosecuted under this section is United States v 
Morris.382 The defendant, Robert Morris, was a first year graduate student studying 
computer science at Cornell University and a son of a chief scientist at a division of 
the National Security Agency. The University had given Morris authorisation to use 
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 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(5). The section also covers attempts that would cause damage, if completed. 
378
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380
 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(C). 
381
 See 18 USC § 1030(e)(8). 
382
 928 F 2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
  
76 
computers in the Computer Science Division. In October 1988, Morris created a 
program later to be called the INTERNET ‘worm,’ that would spread widely, yet 
draw little attention and he programmed it so that it would be difficult for other 
programmers to detect and therefore ‘kill’. Morris launched the worm from a 
computer in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in November 1988 and the 
worm got out of hand, actually replicating and reinfecting at a faster rate than he had 
anticipated. When he realised the damage being done he tried to stop the worm by 
sending an anonymous message over the network to warn programmers and advise 
them how to kill the worm and prevent reinfection. Unfortunately, his attempt failed 
because the network was too clogged and the warning message did not get through in 
time. The worm spread and affected networked computers, including government and 
universities’ systems, causing some 6,200 computers to shut down. Labour costs to 
clear the software ran from approximately $96 million to $11.1 billion. 
 
According to the experts in the field, the worm did not damage computer 
hardware or software, but this did not exonerate Morris from his conduct. However, 
Morris argued (inter alia) that he did not access the computers unauthorised; rather, 
he had exceeded his authority. The court held that he did not ‘exceed authorisation’ 
since it contended that he was totally unauthorised to access those computers into 
which he released the worm. Morris was expelled from Cornell, sentenced to three 
years’ probation, 400 hours of community service, and a fine of $10,000 and the costs 
of his supervision.  This case sets a precedent that a person who creates worms and 
virus can be held accountable. 
 
Most recently, on 16 October 2006, a San Diego federal court sentenced Jay 
Vern Heim for recklessly damaging a protected computer.383 Heim pleaded guilty and 
also admitted that he was a founding partner and former employee of Facility 
Automation Systems (FAS), a San Diego company installing and maintaining 
building automation systems.384 Additionally, Heim admitted that on 26 January 2006, 
he used the username and password assigned to FAS for its Internet domain, 
                                               
383
 See United States Department of Justice ‘California man sentenced for recklessly damaging a 
protected computer owned by his former employer.’ Available at 
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facilityautomationsystems.com, and redirected all traffic, including electronic mail, to 
a server at Heim’s new employer, the Monero Valley Unified School District.385 Heim 
redirected the traffic knowing that FAS’s web site and electronic mail services would 
be inaccessible.386 Lost productivity and restoring services costs exceeded $6,000. 
Heim was sentenced to two years’ probation and fined $500 and was also required to 
make a $6,050 restitution to FAS.387 
 
2.1.6 Knowingly and intending to defraud, trafficking in any password or similar 
information through which a computer may be accessed without authorisation 
 
This section penalises anyone trafficking in passwords or similar information through 
which a computer may be accessed without authorisation if the trafficking affects 
interstate or foreign commerce or if the United States Government uses such 
computer.388 
 
The first instance of a trespasser charged and convicted under this section was 
the case of Kevin David Mitnick. Mitnick was arrested in December 1988.389 ‘Mitnick 
was a colorful figure who went by the code name ‘Condor,’ was listed under the 
telephone directory as ‘James Bond,’ and had ‘007’ as the last three digits of his 
telephone number.’390 Before the conviction Mitnick had a long list of encounters 
with law enforcement and security officials.391 Mitnick was charged with four counts 
of computer fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1030, including stealing programs valued at US$ 1 
million from the Digital Equipment Corporation and using unauthorised service codes 
to avoid telephone charges while accessing computer systems at Leeds University in 
England.392 Digital Equipment Corporation reported that reworking its software and 
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repairing the damage Mitnick had caused would cost them more than US$ 4 million in 
downtime.393 
 
Mitnick was treated as a hard-core criminal, denied bail and not allowed to 
make phone calls fearing that he would access other computers over the telephone 
lines.394 Mitnick was severely restricted in prison and considered a high risk and 
danger to the public.395 According to the authorities Mitnick could ‘hack into 
computers using just his voice and a phone’.396 Finally, Mitnick was sentenced to one 
year of imprisonment, six months in a residential treatment program and three years’ 
probation was forbidden to use a computer or associate with other computer 
criminals.397 The Justice Department considered this sentence the most severe a 
hacker ever received.398 
 
2.1.7 Transmitting in commerce any communication containing any threat to 
damage a protected computer, intentionally to extort money or other valuables 
 
This section criminalises transmitting threatening communication to damage a 
protected computer, intentionally to extort money or other valuables.399 It addresses a 
growing problem: hackers threatening to crash systems if their demands are not met. 
400
 For instance, the United States Justice Department states that recently an individual 
threatened to crash a computer system if not allowed access and given an account.401 
In another case an individual penetrated a city government’s computer system and 
encrypted the data on a hard drive, thus leading the victim to believe an extortion 
demand was impending.402 
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This section intends punishing anyone intending to extort any money or other 
valuables from any person transmitting in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to damage a protected computer.403 
 
2.2 The Stored Communications Act 
 
This Act protects the privacy of stored electronic communications, either before 
transmitting communication or after delivery, if keeping a copy of the message.404 
These provisions target technologies such as electronic mail and computer 
transmissions, when keeping copies of the messages.405 This section criminalises: 
 
• intentionally accessing an unauthorised facility providing an electronic 
communication;406 
 
• intentionally exceeding authority to access a facility providing an electronic 
communication;407 
 
• and obtaining, altering or preventing authorised access to a wire or electronic 
communication in electronic storage.408 
 
Basically, punishment for these offences is a fine, or imprisonment for not 
exceeding a year, or both, for a first offence, and a fine, or imprisonment for not more 
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than five years, or both, for a subsequent offence.409 However, penalties increase if the 
offence was committed for commercial gain or malicious damage. In such cases the 
imprisonment term increases by not more than five years for a first offence, and by 
not more than ten years for a subsequent offence.410 
 
2.3 The Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Access-Devices 
 
This section criminalises fraud and related activities connected with access devices if 
the offence affects the interstate or foreign commerce.411 It outlaws: 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud producing, using or trafficking in a 
counterfeit access device.412 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud trafficking in or using an unauthorised device 
during any one-year period and obtaining anything of a value aggregating at least 
$1,000.413 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud possessing fifteen or more counterfeit 
devices or unauthorised access devices.414 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud producing, trafficking in or possessing access 
device-making equipment.415 
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• Knowingly and intending to defraud transacting with an access device issued to 
any person to receive anything of value during any one-year period valued at not 
less than $1,000.416 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud soliciting for offering an access device, or 
selling information regarding or applying to obtain an access device, without the 
issuer of the access device’s authorisation.417 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud using, producing, trafficking in or possessing 
a telecommunications instrument modified or altered to obtain unauthorised use of 
telecommunications services.418 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud using, producing, trafficking in or possessing 
a scanning receiver.419 
 
• Knowingly using, producing, trafficking in or possessing hardware or software 
knowing it has been configured to modify telecommunications identifying 
information associated with a telecommunications instrument; to use the 
instrument to obtain unauthorised telecommunications service.420 
 
• Knowingly and intending to defraud arranging for a person to present an access 
device’s transactions record to the owner for payment, without a credit card 
owner’s authorisation.421 
 
The offence is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 15 years, or both, for a first offence, and a fine or imprisonment for not 
more than 20 years, or both, for a subsequent offence.422 
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2.4 The Use of Interstate Facilities to Transmit Information about a Minor 
 
This section proscribes using the mail or any interstate or foreign commerce facility, 
or using the mail or a facility within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States to transmit information about a minor.423 It criminalises: 
 
• Knowingly initiating to transmit a person’s details knowing that person to be 
below the age of 16 years, intending to entice, encourage, offer or solicit any 
person to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be criminally 
liable.424 
 
• Any attempt to violate this law.425 
 
Upon conviction, a person is liable to a fine, or imprisonment not exceeding 
five years, or both.426 
 
2.5 The Communications Decency Act 
 
This section criminalises the use of a telecommunications device in interstate or 
foreign communications for obscene or harassing communications.427 
 
2.5.1 Prohibited acts generally 
 
This section prohibits: 
 
• Making, or soliciting and initiating to transmit any obscene communication or 
child pornography, intending to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person.428 
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• Making, or soliciting and initiating to transmit any obscene communication or 
child pornography knowing the communication’s recipient to be under 18 years, 
disregarding whether the communication’s maker placed the call or initiated the 
communication.429 
 
• Calling or utilising a telecommunications device without disclosing identity and 
intending to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the receiving end, 
disregarding whether conversation or communication ensues.430 
 
• Repeatedly ringing a telephone number intending to harass any person at the 
receiving end.431 
 
• Repeatedly calling or initiating communication with a telecommunications device 
during which communication ensues solely to harass any person at the receiving 
end.432 
 
• Knowing permitting any telecommunications facility under own control to be used 
in committing any criminal offence under this section.433 
 
These offences are punishable by a fine, or a maximum imprisonment of two 
years, or both.434 
 
2.5.2 Prohibited acts for commercial purposes 
 
This section criminalises: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
428
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(A). 
429
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(B). 
430
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(C). 
431
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(D). 
432
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(E). 
433
 See 47 USC § 223(a)(2). 
434
 See 47 USC § 223(a). 
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• Knowingly using a telephone, within the United States, to make an obscene 
communication for commercial purposes or allowing a telephone under one’s own 
control to be used for this purpose;435 or  
 
• Knowingly using a telephone, within the United States, available to anyone below 
18 years or to anyone without consent to make an indecent communication for 
commercial purposes, disregarding whether the communication’s maker placed 
the call, or allowing a telephone facility under one’s own control to be used for 
this purpose.436 
 
Conviction is punishable by a fine or a maximum imprisonment of two years, 
or both.437 
 
2.6 The Child Online Protection Act 
 
This law criminalises knowingly availing any harmful material to minors for 
commercial purposes ‘by means of the World Wide Web,’ in interstate or foreign 
commerce, unless the person has restricted access to minors.438 
 
The offence is punishable by a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months, 
or both.439 Further, anyone intentionally violating this law is additionally liable to a 
                                               
435
 See 47 USC § 223(b)(1). 
436
 See 47 USC § 223(b)(2). 
437
 See 47 USC § 223(b)(1) and (b)(2)(B). 
438
 See the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 47 USC § 231(a)(1). Available at 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode47/usc_sec_47_00000231----000-.html [Accessed 5 
December 2006]. The Act defines the term ‘by means of the World Wide Web’ as by placement of 
material in a computer server-based file archive so that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using 
hypertext transfer protocol or any successor protocol. It also defines the term ‘material that is harmful 
to minors’ as communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other 
matter of any kind that is obscene or that: 
• the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material 
as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the 
prurient interest; 
• depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or 
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a 
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and  
• taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
See also 47 USC § 231(e)(1) and (e)(6), respectively. Further, see 47 USC § 231(c)(1). 
439
 See 47 USC § 231(a)(1). 
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fine not exceeding $50,000 for each violation and a further civil penalty not exceeding 
the same amount for each violation.440 
 
2.7 The Copyright Act 
       
This statute creates copyright infringement for unlawfully reproducing and 
distributing copyright including by electronic means.441 The criminal infringement 
statute has three elements: 
 
• infringement of a copyright; 
• done wilfully; and 
• for commercial or private benefits.442 
 
Punishment for this offence is a fine, or imprisonment for a maximum of five 
years, or both, for a first offence, if consisting of reproducing or distributing at least 
ten copies or phonorecords of a copyrighted work, valued at not less than $2,500.443 
Punishment for a subsequent offence is a fine, or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding ten years, or both.444 However, in any other case, punishment for this 
offence is a fine, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.445 
 
2.8 Concerns 
 
Although, the United States’ cybercrime laws are apparently comprehensive, there are 
some concerns: 
                                               
440
 See 47 USC 231(a)(2) and (3). According to these subsections each day of violation constitutes a 
separate offence. 
441
 See the Copyright Act of 1976 (as amended) 17 USC § 501(a). Available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/copyright.act.chapt5.html [Accessed 6 December 2006]. 
‘Copyright infringement’ broadly refers to the unauthorised use of protected material by intellectual 
property rights particularly the copyright violating the original copyright owner’s exclusive rights, such 
as the right to reproduce or distribute the copyrighted work. 
442
 See 17 USC § 506-(a). Anyone violating this law is criminally liable in addition to any other 
provisions of any other law. See 18 USC § 2319-(a). Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/18usc2319.htm [Accessed 18 December 2006]. 
443
 See 18 USC § 2319(b)(1). 
444
 See 18 USC § 2319(b)(2). 
445
 See 18 USC § 2319(b)(3). 
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• The United States cybercrime laws are dispersed in too many different pieces of 
legislation, which means that securing convictions may sometimes be difficult for 
lack of identifying the relevant law. 
 
• The United States tends to pass severe and restrictive cybercrime laws that place 
unacceptably heavy burdens on legally protected speech, and are thus 
unconstitutional. Thus, in Reno v American Civil Liberties Union446 the Supreme 
Court invalidated portions of the Communications Decency Act regarding 
‘indecent’ communication by a telecommunication device and ‘patently offensive’ 
communications through use of interactive computer service to minors. The court 
struck down these provisions intended to protect children from indecent speech as 
unconstitutional, for infringing the First Amendment right to free speech and for 
not allowing parents to decide on what was acceptable material for their children. 
Further, the court stated that the provisions extended to non-commercial speech 
and did not define ‘patently offensive’, a term legally undefined. Likewise, the 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) overly restricts adults from legally 
accessible Internet sites. According to the Center for Democracy and Technology 
‘COPA places unconstitutional burdens on a wide category of protected speech, 
while failing to achieve its goal of protecting children.’447 Hence, in 1998, in 
Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union448 the district court granted a temporary 
restraining order against this law. Again, in 2002, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the lower court decision enjoining Internet pornography law because it would 
overly restrict adults from legally accessible Internet sites.449 
 
• The United States actively participated in drafting the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime; this was generally unwelcome, the American public 
viewed the drafting as secret until the public release of draft 19 in 2000.450 
                                               
446
 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
447
 See the Center for Democracy and Technology ‘Child Online Protection Act (COPA).’ Available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/copa/ [Accessed 5 December 2006]. 
448
 532 U.S. 1037, 121 S. Ct 1997 (2001). 
449
 See Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
450
 See Mike Godwin ‘Watch out: an international treaty on cybercrime sounds like a great idea, until 
you read the fine print.’ Available at http://cryptome.org/cycrime-godwin.htm [Accessed 5 December 
2006]. Although the United States is not a member of the Council of Europe, it participated in drafting 
the Convention as an ‘observer’. It accepted the invitation and was active in the Convention’s drafting 
through the Department of Justice. The Convention was adopted by the Council on 8 November 2001 
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However, the Justice Department responded that it made several presentations and 
met with stakeholders in negotiating the Convention.451 Actually, the American 
public had many reservations about the Convention, arguing that the Convention 
threatens their core civil liberties protections by: 
o failing ‘to provide meaningful privacy and civil liberties protections’ and 
being too broad in defining crimes and covering much more than computer-
related crimes;452 
o lacking a ‘dual criminality’ provision providing that an activity must be a 
criminal offence in both countries before one country can demand cooperation 
from another.453 This would require the United States law enforcement 
officials to co-operate with a foreign police force in investigating an activity 
that, while criminal in their jurisdiction, is perfectly legal in the United 
States.454 Additionally, the Convention places a large burden on the business 
industry to assist law enforcement in investigations.455 As a result, businesses 
worry that the Convention provisions would increase costs to service 
providers, and hinder the development of security technologies and the sale of 
encryption programs, thus negatively impacting on e-commerce;456 and  
o supporting the ratification of the Convention despite no major European 
country having ratified the Convention.457 The American public considered 
this to be an attempt by the government ‘to obtain more power than it could 
obtain with the USA PATRIOT Act after September11, 2001.’458 To fully 
attain its purpose in effectively deterring cybercrime, more states will have to 
sign the Convention and abide by its provisions.459 To bind the United States, 
the Convention requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.460 
                                                                                                                                       
and signed by the United States on 23 November 2001. See 2.5 Chap 2 above. See also the FAQs on 
the Convention note 238. 
451
 See Godwin note 450. 
452
 See the Electronic Privacy Information Center (hereinafter, ‘EPIC’) ‘The Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime.’ Available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/ccc.html#summary 
[Accessed 22 August 2006]. 
453
 Ibid. 
454
 See the EPIC ibid. See also Godwin note 450. 
455
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 18(1) 
456
 See the FAQs note 238. 
457
 Although 30 countries participated in signing the Convention in November 2001, the only major 
European country which ratified the Convention is France in 2006. See the Convention on Cybercrime 
CETS No.: 185 note 237. 
458
 See EPIC note 452. 
459
 See FAQs note 238. 
460
 See Godwin note 450. 
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‘[W]hether senators decide that the need to combat cybercrimes trumps 
concerns about submitting U.S. citizens and companies to foreign criminal 
process remains an open question.’461 
 
2.9 Concluding remarks 
 
Generally, the United States has comprehensive legislation governing cybercrime; it 
criminalises nine out of ten types of cybercrimes and the country also has severe 
penalties for this crime.462 
 
Responding generally to the Americans’ sentiments towards the Convention, 
the Department of Justice explains that its delegation ‘worked hard to balance 
attentiveness to the suggestions of other countries with respect for the strengths of 
current U.S. law. As a result, the central provisions of the Convention are consistent 
with the existing framework of U.S. law and procedure.’463 On 29 September 2006 the 
United States became a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. 
The Convention entered into force for the United States on 1 January 2007.464 The 
Department of Justice explains that ‘the Convention is in full accord with all U.S. 
constitutional protections, such as free speech and other civil liberties, and will 
require no change to U.S. laws.’465 The United States also urges all states to consider 
joining the Convention.466 
 
                                               
461
 See Godwin note 450. The United States’ sentiments towards the Convention are generally 
applicable to all countries. 
462
 See McConnell International note 1. 
463
 See FAQs note 238. See also Brenner (note 67) 34-35. 
464
 See the United States Department of State ‘Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime’ (29 
September 2006). Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73354.htm [Accessed 23 
November 2006]. On 22 September 2006, the United States President signed the instrument of 
ratification for the Convention and on 29 September 2006 the country became a party to the 
Convention upon deposit of ratification at the headquarters of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 
France. 
465
 The Department of Justice ‘Statement of Attorney General Alberto R Gonzales on the passage of the 
Cybercrime Convention’ (4 August 2006). Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_499.html [Accessed 23 November 2006]. 
466
 The U.S. Department of State note 237. 
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3. South Africa 
 
South Africa regulates cybercrime under: 
 
• The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
 
• The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communications-Related Information Act 70 of 2002. 
 
• The Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996 as amended by the Films and 
Publications Amendment Act 34 of 1999 and Act 18 of 2004. 
 
• The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 
1980, 66 of 1983, 52 of 1984, 39 of 1986, 13 of 1988, 61 of 1989, 125 of 1992, the 
Intellectual Property Amendment Laws 38 of 1997 and the Copyright Amendment 
Act of 9 of 2002. 
 
3.1 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
 
The ECTA resulted from the South African Law Reform Commission’s democratic 
and consultative investigation of computer crime, from 1999 until 2002, when the law 
was enacted.467 Mainly, the Act aims to facilitate e-commerce by creating legal 
certainty and promoting confidence in electronic transactions, and addresses 
cybercrime in Chapter XIII.468 
 
This chapter introduces the following statutory criminal offences related to 
information systems, the first in South African jurisprudence: 
 
• Unauthorised access to and interception of data 
                                               
467
 See the South African Law Reform Commission issue paper 14. Available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/papers.htm [Accessed 24 November 2006]. See also the ECTA note 318. 
The ECTA has been operating since 2 August 2002. 
468
 See the ECTA note 318, particularly, Chap XIII. 
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• Interference with data 
• Computer-related extortion 
• Computer-related fraud and forgery 
• Attempt, and aiding and abetting 
 
3.1.1 Unauthorised access to and interception of data 
 
Subject to the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communications-related Information Act 70 of 2002, this section criminalises 
intentionally accessing or intercepting any data without authority.469 This section 
makes hackers and crackers criminally liable.470 
 
3.1.2 Interference with data 
 
This section proscribes intentionally interfering with data by modifying, destroying or 
otherwise rendering the data ineffective.471 For example, a person distributing a virus 
programme commits this offence. Further, this offence includes the trafficking or 
possession of passwords or security-overriding devices to intentionally interfere with 
data.472 It also includes the actual use of security overriding devices and denial of 
service attacks.473 
 
3.1.3 Computer-related extortion 
 
This section criminalises the unauthorised accessing, intercepting or interfering with 
data or threatening to do so for obtaining unlawful proprietary advantage by 
                                               
469
 See the ECTA s 86(1). The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communications-related Information Act 70 of 2002 (hereinafter, ‘RICPIC’) repeals the Interception 
and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 contained in this section. The ECTA defines ‘access’ as 
accessing data and continuing to do so after noting that such access is unauthorised. However, the Act 
does not define ‘unauthorised’. See also the ECTA s 85. Further, see the RICPIC available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a70-02.pdf [Accessed 24 November 2006]. 
470
 See the discussion of hacking and cracking at 2.3.2 Chap one above. 
471
 See the ECTA s 86(2). 
472
 See the ECTA s 86(3). 
473
 See the ECTA s 86(4) and (5). 
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undertaking to cease such action, or by undertaking to restore any damage these 
actions caused.474 
 
3.1.4 Computer-related fraud and forgery 
 
This section prohibits intentionally accessing, intercepting or interfering with data for 
obtaining any unlawful advantage by faking data with the intent that it be considered 
or acted upon as if it were authentic.475 
 
3.1.5 Attempt, and aiding and abetting 
 
The Act allows for degrees of participation in any offence to be criminalised. 
Therefore, an attempt to commit any criminal offence prohibited under this chapter 
amounts to a criminal offence.476 Further, the Act also prohibits the aiding and 
abetting of any person committing these criminal offences.477 
 
The ECTA also regulates the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail 
messages, known as ‘spam.’ The Act provides that the sending of such mail must 
allow the consumer an option to cancel subscription to that mailing list and give the 
identifying particulars of the provider of the consumer’s personal details, upon the 
consumer’s request.478 Failing to comply or continuing to send the unwanted e-mails 
constitutes a criminal offence.479 Further, the Act outlaws any agreement that could be 
implied by the consumer’s failure to respond to spam.480 
 
The Act punishes all these offences by a fine or a maximum imprisonment of 
five years.481 
                                               
474
 See the ECTA s 87(1). This is the traditional ‘blackmail’ or extortion. 
475
 See the ECTA s 87(2). This amounts to fraud, or the specialized form of fraud known as ‘forgery 
and uttering.’ 
476
 See the ECTA s 88(1). The prohibited offences are those referred to in ss 86 and 87. 
477
 See the ECTA s 88(2). This section takes care of accomplices to cybercrime. 
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 See the ECTA s 45(1). 
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 See the ECTA ss 45(3) and (4). 
480
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3.2 The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communications-related Information Act 
 
Under this Act, unlawfully intercepting or attempting to intercept communication to 
obtain confidential information is a criminal offence, except for those enforcing the 
law. This law extends to communications over the Internet.482  
 
Conviction is punishable by a fine not exceeding R2 000 000, or imprisonment 
for not more than ten years.483 
 
3.3 The Films and Publications Act 
 
This Act provides for the classification of certain films and publication not suitable 
for persons below 18 years of age and for the registration of Internet service 
providers, obliging service providers to take reasonable steps to prevent distributing 
child pornography.484 Further, this Act prohibits possessing, producing, procuring, 
accessing and distributing child pornography and distributing restricted harmful 
material.485 This also covers activities committed over the Internet.486 Thus, anyone 
possessing, producing, accessing and distributing child pornography, distributing 
restricted harmful material and not meeting the Internet service providers’ obligations 
commits an offence.487 
 
Conviction for this offence is a fine, or imprisonment for not more than ten 
years, or both.488 
                                               
482
 See the RICPIC s 49. 
483
 See the RICPIC Act s 51(1)(b)(i). 
484
 See the Films and Publication Act 65 of 1996 as amended by the Films and Publication Amendment 
Act 34 of 1999 and 18 of 2004 ss 2 and 27A. Available at http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1996/a65-96.pdf 
[Accessed 24 November 2006]. 
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 See the Films and Publication Act ss27 and 28. Restricted harmful material includes: 
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• bestiality; and 
• violent sexual content and extreme violence that might induce causing harm. See the Films and 
Publications Act schs 1 and 2. 
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 See the Films and Publication Act s 2(a)(i). 
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 See the Films and Publication Act ss 27, 27A and 28. 
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3.4 The Copyright Act 
 
This Act creates copyright infringement for unlawfully importing, selling, letting, 
offering for selling or hiring, distributing copyright or acquiring an article relating to a 
computer program, thus criminalising: 
 
• infringing a copyright; 
• not being the owner of copyright, and acting without the owner’s licence; and 
• committing the offence for commercial benefits, except for acquiring a computer 
program (which does not include the commercial benefits requirement).489 
 
Upon a first conviction a person is liable to a fine not exceeding R5 000, or 
imprisonment for not more than three years, or both, for each article to which the 
offence relates.490 Subsequently, for each article to which the offence relates, a person 
is liable to a fine not exceeding R10 000, or imprisonment for up to five years, or 
both. 491 
 
3.5 Concerns 
 
As commendable as the Law Commission’s efforts are, as seen by the birth of the 
ECTA, the law still has some loopholes: 
 
• Although the ECTA defines ‘access’, it does not attempt to define ‘unauthorised’; 
as a result, the law is unclear regarding what constitutes ‘unauthorised’ access. 
 
• The Act does not address ‘theft of information’ over the Internet. This issue is still 
very thorny, computer-related or not. Undeniably, information is an intangible 
object, and thus, according to the law an object must be tangible before being 
                                               
489
 See the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 1980, 66 of 
1983, 52 of 1984, 39 of 1986, 13 of 1988, 61 of 1989, 125 of 1992, the Intellectual Property 
Amendment Laws 38 of 1997 and the Copyright Amendment Act of 9 of 2002 ss 23(a)-(c) read with s 
11B available at http://www.gpa.co.za/pdf/legislation/Copyright%20Act.pdf [Accessed 9 January 
2007]. 
490
 See the Copyright Act s 27(6)(a). 
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 See the Copyright Act s 27(6)(b). 
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stolen. Consequently, theft of information cannot amount to theft. However, this 
argument is yet to be addressed by the court. The South African Law Reform 
Commission is currently considering criminalising this conduct.492 
 
• The penalties are too light given how much cybercrime causes; the damage far 
exceeds the punishment. 
 
• Cybercrime is a serious offence that must be treated on its own; merely addressing 
it in one chapter is hardly giving it the attention it deserves. 
 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
 
According to South African law ‘in instances where there is a lack of law in a specific 
area, reference to international jurisdictions is permissible.’493 Moreover, South Africa 
is a signatory of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.494 This allows 
South Africa to borrow from other countries and the Convention. Consequently, South 
Africa may prosecute all types of cybercrimes on the basis of permissibility however; 
this is yet to be tested in the courts of law. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigating the cybercrime legislation of three countries, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and South Africa, shows initiatives in reforming legal 
systems to address cybercrime. Whilst these countries’ laws may not be perfect and 
water-tight, they demonstrate a positive commitment to the fight against cybercrime. 
                                               
492
 See the South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion paper 109’ (October 2005). Available 
at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm [Accessed 8 February 2007]. 
493
 Reinhardt Buys (ed) Cyberlaw @ SA top 100 FAQs virtualbook 294. 
494
 South Africa is one of the four countries that participated ‘as observers’ in negotiating the 
Convention on Cybercrime. See, for example, FAQs note 238 and the Convention on Cybercrime 
CETS No.:185 note 237. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION FOR 
LESOTHO 
 
Overview 
 
As criminals take their criminal activities to new heights in the electronic age and 
having identified Lesotho’s current laws’ shortcomings regarding cybercrime, (we can 
conclude that) Lesotho is urged to (must) seriously consider adopting cybercrime 
legislation.495 However, the difficulty lies in establishing a well defined rule of law to 
find and prosecute cybercriminals. This chapter examines the approach that Lesotho 
can take in developing a comprehensive legal framework addressing cybercrime. 
 
1. Cybercrime model law for Lesotho 
 
Lesotho needs a clearly defined rule of law including a strong deterrent for 
cybercrime, to effectively protect valuable information and systems and people 
generally, so that Lesotho’s citizens can truly enjoy the digital age’s benefits. 
Countries embarking on the introduction of cybercrime laws seek a model to follow. 
Lesotho is likely to succeed in developing a comprehensive legal structure combating 
cybercrime because of the existing international and supranational initiatives 
providing guidance for an effective framework addressing this crime.496 Further, 
Lesotho has the added advantage of learning and borrowing from the experiences of 
her sister countries (such as the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa) 
that have already enacted cybercrime laws.497 
 
In developing a legal framework addressing cybercrime Lesotho must legislate 
on: 
 
                                               
495
 See 1.1 Chap one above. 
496
 See generally Chap two above. 
497
 See generally Chap three above. 
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• Substantive criminal law 
• Procedural law 
• Mutual legal assistance agreements 
 
1.1 Substantive criminal law 
 
To prosecute cybercrime, Lesotho must harmonise substantive offences, by: 
 
• creating a new law specifically targeting cybercrime; 
• amending old laws to encompass the use of computer technology in committing 
conventional offences; and 
• establishing ancillary liability and sanctions. 
 
1.1.1 Creating a new law 
 
Creating a new law is absolutely necessary to address crimes that Lesotho does not 
comprehensively address. These are offences committed against the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of computer data and systems, crimes that never existed 
before the advent of computers.498 To address the most serious cybercrimes, Lesotho 
must criminalise: 
 
• Illegal access 
• Illegal interception 
• Data interference 
• System interference 
• Misuse of devices499 
 
 
 
                                               
498
 See 2.2.1 Chap one above. 
499
 The international and supranational initiatives in chapter two above provide a minimal listing of 
conduct that States must criminalise to address the most serious cybercrime. Particularly, see the 
Convention (note 168) Art 2-6. See also Schjolberg (note 56) 11. 
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Illegal access 
 
Lesotho must prohibit intentionally accessing the whole or any part of a computer 
system, without the right to do so, or the unauthorised access to data.500 Illegal access 
to computer systems and networks is ‘computer trespass,’ ‘cracking’ or ‘hacking’ 
offences; merely activating the computer security devices constitutes an offence, 
regardless of whether access to the data is obtained.501 Basically, illegal access 
dangerously threatens and attacks the security (the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) of computer systems and data.502 This provision allows organisations and 
individuals to operate their systems in an undisturbed and uninhibited manner.503 
Access requires entering another computer system or network.504 For some States like 
the United States and South Africa, merely accessing a computer system is not an 
offence; they additionally require obtaining information.505 Thus, an offence is 
committed when a person intentionally and without authority obtains access to stored 
data. Generally, ‘‘[o]btaining information’ includes the mere observation and reading 
of the information, i.e. there is no requirement that the information has to be 
downloaded.’506 In contrast, the United Kingdom does not require the obtaining of 
any information, merely accessing any program or data constitutes an offence.507 
 
Like the United Kingdom, Lesotho can take the wide approach and criminalise 
mere hacking.508 Alternatively, Lesotho can criminalise this conduct by attaching 
qualifying elements, such as infringing security measures, special intent to obtain 
computer data or other dishonest intent, or relating to a computer system that is 
connected to another computer system.509 Requiring that the offence be committed 
relating to a computer connected to another computer system will allow Lesotho to 
                                               
500
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 2. 
501
 See Schjolberg (note 56) 11. Basically, ‘computer trespass’ is the unauthorized intrusion, the 
‘hacking’ or ‘cracking’ of a computer system. For the definition of ‘hacking’ and ‘cracking’ see the 
discussion of hacking and cracking at 2.3.2 Chap one above. 
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 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 44. 
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 See ibid para 46. 
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 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)(C), the ECTA s 86(1), respectively. See also 2.1.1 and 3.1.1 Chap three 
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 See the Computer Misuse Act s 1. See also 1.2.1 Chap three above. 
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 See the Computer Misuse Act s 1. See also 1.2.1 Chap three above. 
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 See the Convention (note 166) Art 2. Lesotho may follow the United States and South Africa’s 
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exclude a person accessing a stand-alone computer without any use of another 
computer system.510 Lesotho may restrict the offence to illegal access to networked 
computer systems (including telecommunication services, public networks and private 
networks, such as Intranets and Extranets).511 
 
Illegal interception 
 
Lesotho must proscribe intentionally intercepting non-public transmissions of 
computer data, including electromagnetic emissions, to, from or within a computer 
system, by technical means.512 This provision aims to protect the right to privacy in 
data communications.513 States worldwide protect the right to privacy in data 
communications differently and in different degrees.514 For instance, South Africa 
punishes unlawfully intercepting communication to obtain confidential information, 
except for enforcing the law and, further, criminalises intercepting any data without 
authority.515 Similarly, the United States protects the privacy of stored electronic 
communications and criminalises intentionally accessing an unauthorised facility or 
exceeding authority to access a facility providing an electronic communication and 
obtaining access to such communication.516 On the other hand, the United Kingdom 
does not address this conduct.517 Accordingly, Lesotho must protect her citizens’ right 
to privacy in electronic communications, without over-criminalising; service 
providers monitoring traffic on their own networks and the protection of their rights 
and obligations and property must not be regarded as illegal interception.518 The 
conduct is equivalent to the traditional tapping and recording of oral telephone 
communications. Indeed, Lesotho traditionally protects the right to privacy of 
communications.519 
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The offence must cover all categories of electronic communication, by 
telecommunication, e-mail or file transfer.520 Further, the offence must include 
monitoring, surveillance, listening to the content of communications and obtaining the 
content of data either directly, through access and use of the computer system, or 
indirectly, through the use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices.521 
Interception may also include recording.522 The offence requires technical means, to 
avoid over-criminalising.523 Technical means includes all kinds of technical devices, 
namely, computer programmes, passwords and codes.524 
 
The offence covers ‘non-public’ transmissions of computer data, qualifying 
the nature of the transmission process and not the nature of the data transmitted.525 
Despite the data communicated being publicly available, if parties wish to 
communicate confidentially, the communication is ‘non-public.’526 Similarly, if the 
transmission is unavailable until paid for, as in Pay-TV, the signal is ‘non-public.’527 
 
For consistency of prohibiting and applying the law, if Lesotho requires 
committing the offence with dishonest intent, or relating to a computer system that is 
connected to another computer system for illegal access, similar qualifying elements 
must also be required to attach criminal liability to this offence.528 The mental element 
is crucial for criminal liability regarding illegal interception, thus Lesotho must 
require that the offence be committed ‘intentionally’ and ‘without right.’529 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
of communications emanates from the country’s supreme law, the Constitution, which protects 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Further, see the Lesotho Constitution of 1993 s 11. Available at 
http://www.parliament.ls/documents/constitution.php [Accessed 5 January 2007).  
520
 See Schjolberg (note 56) 11. 
521
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 53. 
522
 See ibid. 
523
 See ibid. 
524
 See ibid. 
525
 See ibid para 54. 
526
 See ibid. 
527
 See ibid. 
528
 See ibid para 59. 
529
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 3. 
  
100 
Data interference 
 
Lesotho must criminalise intentionally damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or 
suppressing computer data without right.530 This provision provides computer data 
and programs with protections similar to tangible objects, hence protecting the 
integrity, availability and the proper functioning or use of stored data or computer 
programs.531 
 
 ‘Damaging’ and ‘deteriorating’ are overlapping forms of conduct, rendering 
the content of data and programs useless or meaningless.532 Deleting data is equal to 
destroying a tangible object, and occurs by obliterating data and programs from the 
original or previous legal appearance in their formalised manner.533 ‘Deleting’ 
destroys and makes data unreadable, even if the data can be restored after the 
attack.534 ‘Altering’ requires modifying the existing data, even if the data remains 
understandable after the attack.535 Examples include defacing the website, introducing 
malicious codes and adding data without deleting, thus changing the existing data. 
‘Suppressing’ covers activities preventing or terminating the availability of the data to 
the person legally entitled to the data, for instance, when causing the computer data to 
disappear without being deleted.536 
 
 This conduct does not cover common activities for designing networks or 
common operating or commercial practices like testing or protecting the security of 
systems.537 Likewise, modifying traffic data to facilitate anonymous communications 
(such as anonymous remailer systems activities) or modifying data to secure 
communications (such as encryption) are not ‘without right’ and therefore are not data 
interference.538 However, Lesotho may criminalise certain abuses regarding 
                                               
530
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 4. 
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 See the explanatory Report (note 221) para 60. 
532
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 61. See also Schjolberg (note 56) 12. 
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 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 61. 
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 See ibid. 
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 See ibid. 
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 See ibid para 62. 
538
 See ibid. 
  
101 
anonymous communications, such as altering the packet header information to 
conceal the perpetrator’s identity in committing a crime.539 
 
 Countries around the world respond to conduct differently. For example, the 
United States addresses this conduct by criminalising intentionally accessing an 
unauthorised facility or exceeding authority to access a facility providing an electronic 
communication and altering or preventing authorised access to such 
communication.540 On the other hand, South Africa punishes intentionally interfering 
with data by modifying, destroying or otherwise rendering the data ineffective.541 At 
another extreme, the United Kingdom generally outlaws unauthorised acts with intent 
to impair operation of a computer.542 
  
For clarity and simplicity, unlike the above countries, Lesotho can merely 
criminalise intentionally damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing 
computer data without right. Moreover, Lesotho may require that an offence be 
committed when the conduct results in serious harm; interpreting what constitutes 
such serious harm is entirely up to Lesotho.543 
 
System interference 
 
Lesotho must prohibit serious intentional hindering of the functioning of a computer 
system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, or 
suppressing computer data.544 This provision aims to criminalise intentionally 
hindering the lawful use of computer systems, including telecommunication facilities, 
by interfering with computer data, thus protecting the interest of operators and users 
of computer or telecommunications systems for their proper functioning.545 
 
                                               
539
 See ibid. 
540
 See 18 UCS § 2701. See also 2.2 Chap three above. 
541
 See the ECTA s 86(2). See also 3.1.2 Chap three at above. 
542
 See the Police and Justice Act s 36. See also 1.4.2 Chap three above. 
543
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 4(2). See also the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 64. 
544
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 5. 
545
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 65. Hindering refers to activities interfering with the 
proper functioning of the computer system, such as, imputing, transmitting, damaging, deleting, 
deteriorating, altering, or suppressing computer data. 
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 Hindering the functioning of computer systems is critical; for instance, 
hindering the functioning of essential services computer systems may have grave 
implications for society.546 Thus, for example, targeting critical infrastructures like 
energy, broadcasting, transportation and telecommunications may disturb and 
significantly threaten public administration and society.547 This conduct constitutes an 
offence whether the hindering is temporary or permanent, partial or total. Hindering 
may occur as a result of denial of service (DoS) attacks.548 Denial of service attacks 
include blocking users from legitimate access by entering wrong passwords for the 
correct user name to block access for that user name, or triggering a denial of service 
attack alert without the attack existing at all.549 The most typical denial of service 
attack is the sending of unsolicited e-mail, which causes nuisance to its recipient, 
particularly when sent in bulk and frequently.550 
 
Countries approach this conduct differently. The United Kingdom criminalises 
this conduct generally, prohibiting unauthorised acts with the intent to impair the 
operation of a computer.551 Also, South Africa criminalises this conduct generally, 
proscribing intentionally interfering with data by modifying, destroying or otherwise 
rendering the data ineffective.552 Additionally, South Africa outlaws the sending of 
unsolicited commercial e-mail if the consumer (the recipient) has told the sender to 
stop sending the unwanted e-mail.553 Again, South Africa criminalises failing to 
provide the consumer with the identifying particulars of the provider of the 
consumer’s personal details, upon the consumer’s request.554 In contrast, the United 
States specifically targets anyone knowingly transmitting a program, information, 
code, or command and intentionally causing damage to an unauthorised protected 
computer, or intentionally accessing an unauthorised protected computer and 
recklessly or otherwise causing damage.555 
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 Like the United States, Lesotho can adopt the specific approach and 
criminalise the serious intentional hindering of the functioning of a computer system 
by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing 
computer data, without right. However, Lesotho will have to determine the extent to 
which the functioning of the system must be hindered - partially or totally, 
temporarily or permanently - to amount to serious harm justifying criminal 
sanction.556 
 
Misuse of devices 
 
Lesotho must criminalise the misuse of devices for committing illegal access or 
interception, or data and system interference.557 This provision aims to criminalise 
producing, selling, obtaining, possessing, distributing or supplying a device (such as a 
computer virus or other malicious programs, or a computer password, access code or 
similar data) intentionally for use in committing a cybercrime.558 
 
 Computer viruses and malicious programs are basic tools for committing 
cybercrimes.559 Computer viruses dangerously and economically threaten cyberspace 
and all netizens.560 This provision covers devices designed or adapted primarily for 
committing cybercrimes.561 It does not cover devices designed or adapted for 
legitimate use (such as tools meant for testing and protecting the security of 
systems).562 
 
 States address this conduct differently. The United States punishes trafficking 
in passwords or similar information through which a computer may be accessed 
without authorisation if the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce or is for 
the United States Government use.563 On the other hand, the United Kingdom has 
recently created a furore by introducing a new offence - developing, owning, and 
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distributing ‘hacker tools’ for criminal use - as this law fails to recognise ‘dual-use’ 
software that could be used both legitimately and otherwise.564 This offence includes 
distributing tools that are ‘likely to be used’ criminally.565 Perhaps, ultimately, the 
British people will realise that this provision aims to restrict the producing and 
distributing of ‘hacker tools’ for illegal purposes, and not to frustrate electronic 
commerce. By contrast, South Africa specifically prohibits unlawfully producing, 
selling offering to sell, obtaining, designing, adapting for use, distributing or 
possessing any device designed for use in committing a cybercrime.566 This includes a 
computer program or a component designed primarily to overcome security measures 
protecting data or performing any act regarding a password, access code or any 
similar data unlawfully intending to utilise the item to contravene this provision.567 
Further, South Africa outlaws the use of any device or computer program to override 
security measures designed to protect data or access to data.568 
 
 In addressing ‘misuse of devices’ Lesotho must prohibit intentionally and 
without right producing, selling obtaining, possessing, distributing or supplying such 
devices, which are designed primarily for use in committing cybercrimes. However, 
Lesotho may require that a certain number of devices be possessed before criminal 
liability attaches.569 
 
1.1.2 Amending old laws 
 
Amending old laws is essential to address crimes that existing Lesotho laws are 
inadequate to prosecute. These are crimes that have existed long before computers but 
are now committed using computer networks..570 Thus, to address the most frequently 
committed conventional crimes using computer networks, Lesotho must criminalise: 
 
• Computer-related forgery 
• Computer-related fraud 
                                               
564
 See the Police and Justice Act s 37. See also 1.4.3 Chap three above. 
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• Computer-related extortion 
• Child pornography 
• Copyright infringement 
 
Computer-related forgery 
 
Lesotho must prohibit intentionally and without right inputting, altering, deleting, or 
suppressing computer data, resulting in inauthentic data that is intended to be 
considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, whether or not the 
data is directly readable and intelligible.571 As Lesotho’s forgery laws require visual 
readability of statements in a document and do not cover computer data, this provision 
will provide the equivalent to the forgery of tangible documents.572 Computer-related 
forgery involves unauthorised creating or altering of stored data to acquire a different 
evidentiary value for legal purposes, relying on the authenticity of information in the 
data to deceive.573 Manipulating computer data with evidentiary value may have the 
same serious implications as paper-based documents; therefore, it must be proscribed 
likewise.574 Basically, this provision aims to protect the legally relevant security and 
reliability of computer data which may have consequences for legal relations.575 
 
 National response towards this conduct varies; the United States and the 
United Kingdom do not address it at all.576 South Africa criminalises intentionally 
accessing, intercepting or interfering with data for obtaining any unlawful advantage 
by faking data with intent that it be considered or acted upon as if it were authentic.577 
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 See the Convention (note 166) Art 7. The unauthorised ‘inputting’ of correct or incorrect data 
corresponds to making a false document. Subsequent ‘altering’ (modifying, varying, partial changing), 
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 In implementing this offence, Lesotho may additionally require an intent to 
defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches.578 
 
Computer-related fraud 
 
Lesotho must criminalise intentionally and without right causing loss of property to 
another, fraudulently or dishonestly intending to obtain an economic benefit for 
oneself or another, without right, by: 
 
• inputting, altering, deleting or suppressing computer data; or  
• interfering with the functioning of a computer system.579 
 
Lesotho’s traditional fraud provisions require deceiving a human being. Since 
deceiving a computer is quite impossible within this meaning, Lesotho needs new 
provisions addressing computer-related fraud.580 Computer fraud involves 
manipulating a computer to obtain an economic benefit or other benefit for oneself or 
another or to cause loss of property.581 The traditional elements for fraud still apply 
for computer-related fraud, namely: 
 
• using incorrect or incomplete information; 
• altering data or programs, or otherwise unlawfully influencing the result of 
computer operations; 
• causing a loss of property or a risk of loss to another; and 
• intending to obtain an unlawful economic gain for oneself or for another.582 
 
This provision aims to criminalise any undue manipulation in data processing that 
intends to effect an illegal transfer of property.583 
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 Computer-related fraud is increasingly becoming a global issue with the rapid 
growth of the information technology.584 It includes various categories of schemes; a 
typical example is stock fraud or online securities fraud.585 Countries’ perceptions 
towards conducts will always differ. The United Kingdom does not address computer-
related fraud.586 On the other hand, the United States criminalises knowingly 
accessing an unauthorised protected computer intending to defraud and obtaining 
anything of value (however, this fraud provision excludes cases involving less than 
$5,000 of computer use in a year).587 Additionally, the United States criminalises 
fraud and related activities connected with access devices if the offence affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.588 At the other extreme, South Africa prohibits both 
computer-related fraud and forgery in one breath (criminalising intentionally 
accessing, intercepting or interfering with data for obtaining any unlawful advantage 
by faking data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon as if it were 
authentic).589 
 
 Unlike South Africa or the United States, Lesotho must have a clearly defined 
computer-related fraud provision that is separate from forgery, and also contained in 
one piece of legislation to avoid confusion. 
 
Computer-related extortion 
 
Lesotho must proscribe the unauthorised accessing, intercepting or interfering with 
data or threatening to do so to intentionally extort money or other valuables by 
undertaking to cease such action or to restore the damage caused. Lesotho’s 
traditional extortion provisions require subjecting a person to pressure to induce 
submission to the extorter’s demands and do not cover computer-related extortion.590 
Computer-related extortion involves transmitting a communication that threatens to 
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damage a computer, in order to obtain unlawful proprietary advantage by undertaking 
to cease such action or to restore the damage caused. The traditional elements for 
extortion still apply for computer-related extortion, namely: 
 
• unlawfully applying pressure; 
• inducing submitting to the demand; and  
• intending to obtain some advantage.591 
 
This provision intends to criminalise the transmission of threats to crash computer 
systems intentionally, in order to extort money or other valuables. 
 
 Cybercriminals use extortion as a new threat: they will crash computer 
systems if their demands are not met. As always, countries respond to conduct 
differently. The United Kingdom does not address computer-related extortion. The 
United States prohibits transmitting threatening communication to damage a protected 
computer, intentionally to extort money or other valuables.592 Similarly, South Africa 
criminalises the unauthorised accessing, intercepting or interfering with data or 
threatening to do so for obtaining unlawful proprietary advantage by undertaking to 
cease such action, or to restore the damage caused.593 
 
 Like South Africa, Lesotho must clearly define computer-related extortion; 
criminalising the unlawful acts and threats to crash systems to intentionally extort an 
economic benefit. 
 
Child Pornography 
 
Lesotho must criminalise offences related to child pornography committed through a 
computer system by prohibiting: 
 
• intentionally and without right producing child pornography for distributing 
through a computer system; 
                                               
591
 See Burchell (note 572) 828-29. 
592
 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(7). See also 2.1.7 Chap three above. 
593
 See the ECTA s 87(1). See also 3.1.3 Chap three above. 
  
109 
• intentionally and without right offering or making available child pornography 
through a computer system; 
 
• intentionally and without right distributing or transmitting child pornography 
through a computer system; 
 
• intentionally and without right procuring child pornography for oneself or for 
another through a computer system; and 
 
• intentionally and without right possessing child pornography in a computer system 
or on a computer-data storage medium.594 
 
Lesotho does not address child pornography.595 This provision aims to protect 
children by modernising the criminal law to address the use of computer systems in 
committing sexual offences against children.596 
 
 Child pornography on the Internet is ever-increasing, primarily for trading the 
material, and threatens to undermine children’s growth by leaving irreparable harm.597 
Yet again, States address this conduct differently. The United Kingdom addresses 
child pornography by criminalising the taking, permitting to be taken or making, 
distributing or showing, possessing, publishing or causing publishing any indecent 
photograph or indecent pseudo-photograph of a child, including by electronic and 
other means capable of converting into a photograph.598 Turning to the United States, 
two separate laws generally regulate this conduct: the Communications Decency Act 
and the Child Online Protection Act.599 The former prohibits making or soliciting and 
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initiating to transmit child pornography intending to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass 
another person or knowing the recipient to be below 18 years.600 The latter prohibits 
knowingly availing harmful material to minors for commercial purposes ‘by means of 
the World Wide Web,’ in interstate or foreign commerce, unless the person has 
restricted access by minors.601 On the other hand, South Africa prohibits possessing, 
producing, procuring, accessing, and distributing child pornography, and also obliges 
service providers to take reasonable steps to prevent the distribution of child 
pornography.602 
 
 In respect of child pornography offences, Lesotho must address pornographic 
material depicting: 
 
• a minor engaged in a sexually explicit conduct; 
• a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and 
• realistic images representing a minor engaged in a sexually explicit conduct. 
 
Still, Lesotho may decide only to criminalise pornographic material depicting a minor 
engaged in a sexual explicit conduct, focusing more directly on protection against 
child abuse.603 However, covering material depicting a person appearing as a minor 
and images representing a minor engaged in a sexually explicit conduct ‘while not 
necessarily creating harm to the ‘child’ depicted in the material, as there might not be 
a real child, might be used to encourage or seduce children into participating in such 
acts, and hence form part of a subculture favouring child abuse.’604 Moreover, for 
international uniformity, Lesotho must define the term ‘minor’ as it relates to child 
pornography as persons under 18 years; however, Lesotho may still require a lower 
age-limit for this offence, but it should not be less than 16 years.605 Further, Lesotho 
may adopt a more specific approach in attaching criminal liability; for example, to 
impose liability only for ‘knowledge and control’ when transmitting or storing 
information. Furthermore, Lesotho may not criminalise procuring and possessing 
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child pornography, but attaching criminal consequences to each participant’s conduct 
in the chain from producing to possessing would be more effective in curtailing the 
production of child pornography.606 To effectively address child pornography online, 
Lesotho must amend the existing law to specifically address traditional child 
pornography. 
 
Copyright infringement 
 
Lesotho must criminalise wilfully committing offences related to infringements of 
copyright and related rights for commercial purposes through a computer system.607 
Lesotho’s copyright law does not address offences committed by electronic means.608 
Reproducing and disseminating copyrighted materials electronically is fairly easy and 
frequently occurs without the copyright holder’s consent, hence the need for criminal 
sanctions.609 This provision seeks to protect the unauthorised copying, reproducing 
and disseminating of copyright and related rights on computer networks. 
 
 Disseminating copyrighted works via the Internet is rapidly increasing, 
causing concern both to copyright holders and those working professionally with 
computer networks.610 Generally, all States criminalise copyright infringement, 
although defining the precise manner of the infringements may vary. For instance, the 
United Kingdom addresses copyright infringements by prohibiting making for selling 
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or hiring, selling, hiring, importing, possessing, offering for selling or hiring, publicly 
exhibiting or distributing, or copying copyright, including a computer program.611 On 
the other hand, the United States criminalises unlawfully reproducing and distributing 
copyright including by electronic means.612 Again, South Africa criminalises 
unlawfully importing, selling, letting, offering for selling or hiring, distributing 
copyright or acquiring an article relating to a computer program.613 
 
Lesotho must establish the wilful committing of copyright infringements and 
related rights for commercial purposes on computer networks as a criminal offence. 
However, Lesotho may ‘wish to go beyond the threshold of “commercial scale” and 
criminalise other types of copyright infringement as well.’614 
 
1.1.3 Establishing ancillary liability and sanctions 
 
Lesotho must establish ancillary liability and define sanctions relating to cybercrimes, 
addressing: 
 
• Attempt and aiding and abetting 
• Corporate liability 
• Reporting requirement 
• Civil rights 
• Sanctions 
 
Attempt and aiding and abetting 
 
Lesotho must criminalise the intentional attempting and aiding and abetting of any 
cybercrime offence intending that an offence be committed.615 This provision aims to 
                                               
611
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establish additional offences relating to attempting and aiding and abetting 
cybercrimes.616 
 
 Legal systems have varying concepts for attempt, and generally, legal systems 
limit the offences for which attempt will be punished. Further, countries may establish 
criminal liability relating to aiding and abetting differently. On the one hand, the 
United Kingdom does not address attempts to commit cybercrimes, but criminalises 
aiding and abetting cybercrimes.617 On the other hand, the United States criminalises 
attempting and aiding and abetting cybercrimes.618 Similarly, South Africa 
criminalises attempts to commit cybercrimes and also prohibits aiding and abetting 
the crimes.619 
 
 In attaching criminal liability for aiding and abetting, Lesotho must require the 
intention to commit a crime, so that no liability attaches to a person acting without the 
requisite intent. For example, although transmitting harmful or malicious code 
through the Internet requires the service provider’s assistance as a conduit, a service 
provider without the criminal intent cannot incur liability under this provision.620 
 
 In criminalising all attempts to commit cybercrimes, Lesotho may find some 
elements of offences conceptually difficult, for instance, the elements of offering and 
making available child pornography. Therefore, Lesotho may criminalise attempt for 
offences that are conceptually easy to attempt. Alternatively, Lesotho may use her 
own discretion in establishing attempt.621 
 
Corporate liability 
 
Lesotho must criminalise the committing of cybercrimes by legal persons. This 
provision intends imposing liability on corporations, associations and similar legal 
persons for the criminal activities committed by a ‘person who has a leading position’ 
                                               
616
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 118. 
617
 See Figure 1 Chap three above. 
618
 See 18 USC § 1030(c). See also 2.1 and Figure one Chap three above, respectively. 
619
 See the ECTA s 88. See also 3.1.5 Chap three above. 
620
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 119. 
621
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 11(2) and (3). Lesotho may even opt not to criminalise attempt. 
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within the legal person, for the legal person’s benefit.622 For attaching liability, four 
conditions must be met: 
 
• the offences Lesotho describes as cybercrimes must have been committed; 
 
• the offence must have been committed for the legal person’s benefit; 
 
• a person in a leading position must have been committed the offence (including 
aiding and abetting); and 
 
• the person in a leading person must have acted based on: 
o the legal person’s power of representation; 
o an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or 
o an authority to exercise control within the legal person.623 
 
Additionally, Lesotho must attach liability to a person in a leading position 
failing to supervise an employee or the legal person’s agent, with the failure 
facilitating the employee’s or agent’s committing a cybercrime.624 Before attaching 
liability, the conditions to be met are: 
 
• the legal person’s employee or agent must have committed the offence; 
• the offence must have been committed for the legal person’s benefit; and 
• committing the offence must have been made possible by the leading person’s 
failure to supervise the employee or agent.625 
 
                                               
622
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 12. See also the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 123. The 
term ‘person who has a leading position’ refers to a natural person in a high position in the 
organization, like a director. Further, see the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 124. 
623
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 12(1). See also the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 124. 
These pre-conditions demonstrate that the person acted within the scope of authority to engage the 
legal person’s liability. 
624
 See the Convention (note 221) Art 12(2). 
625
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 12(2). Failure to supervise must be interpreted to include failure 
to take appropriate and reasonable measures to prevent employees or agents from committing an 
offence on the legal person’s behalf. Such appropriate and reasonable measures could be based on 
factors like the business type, its size, the standards or the established business best practices, and 
others. See also the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 125. 
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States may provide for any form of corporate liability. According to the 
English law a person acting is not speaking or acting for the company. The person 
acts as the company and the mind directing the person’s acts is the company’s mind. 
Thus, if that mind is guilty that guilt is the company’s guilt.626 In the United States, to 
attach corporate criminal liability, the individual must be acting: 
 
• within the scope of employment; 
• partly or for the corporation’s benefit; and  
• intentionally imputing the corporation, perhaps resulting from the corporation’s 
wilful blindness to illegal conduct, among other reasons.627 
 
By implication, South Africa provides for corporate liability by defining a ‘person’ as 
including a public body.628 Unlike these countries, Lesotho must expressly provide for 
corporate liability for committing cybercrimes. Lesotho may attach criminal, civil or 
administrative liability to the legal person.629 However, such liability must not 
prejudice the natural person’s liability for committing the offence.630 More simply, 
‘corporate liability does not exclude individual liability.’631 
 
Reporting requirement        
   
Lesotho must consider enacting a reporting requirement for cybercrimes. Cybercrime 
victims, particularly companies, tend to hide cybercrime attacks because they fear 
negative publicity and lack faith in the law machinery. A reporting requirement will 
assist in investigating and prosecuting a greater number of cybercriminals.632 
Additionally, future cybercrime incidents may be reduced as more prosecutions are 
publicised.633 
                                               
626
 See Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153. 
627
 See, for example, United States v One Parcel of Land, 965 F.2d 316 (7th Cir 1992). 
628
 See the definition of ‘person’ in the ECTA s 1. The Act holds any person criminally liable for 
committing prohibited cybercrimes, according to the Act. See also the ECTA ss 86-88. 
629
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 12(3). 
630
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 12(4). 
631
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 127. 
632
 See Jason Chang ‘Computer hacking: making the case for a national reporting requirement’ (April 
2004) Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School Research Publication No. 2004-
07. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=530825 [Accessed 9 January 
2007]. 
633
 Ibid. 
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Civil rights 
 
Lesotho must create civil rights for enforcing cybercrime violations and also grant the 
courts the power to make an order against a person convicted to pay compensation to 
any party that has suffered from the offending activity. This may provide an incentive 
to report cybercrime violations and to reinstate faith in the law machinery. 
 
Sanctions 
 
Lesotho must provide for punishing all cybercrimes. Undeniably, every State provides 
sanctions for cybercrimes under its criminal law; the United Kingdom, the United 
States and South Africa all punish cybercrimes under their respective laws.634 
According to the seriousness of the cybercrimes committed, Lesotho must adopt 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,’ including ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
for natural persons.635 Moreover, to ensure that legal persons are held liable, Lesotho 
must provide ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal 
sanctions or measures, which include monetary sanctions.’636 Since this provision 
allows for the possibility of other sanctions or measures reflecting the seriousness of 
the offences, Lesotho may create a system of criminal offences and sanctions 
compatible with the existing national legal system.637 
 
1.2 Procedural law 
 
Lesotho must establish powers and procedures for detecting, investigating and 
prosecuting cybercrime. Such powers and procedures will also be used for 
prosecuting and collecting electronic evidence of any criminal offence. These powers 
and procedures are: 
 
                                               
634
 See the United Kingdom law, all the United States laws and South African laws as contained in 
chapter three above. 
635
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 13(1). See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 128. 
636
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 13(2). 
637
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 130 note. Lesotho may employ measures such as 
injunction and forfeiture. 
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• Expedited preservation of stored computer data: measures necessary for 
authorities to order or obtain expeditious preservation of specified stored 
computer data.638 
 
• Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data: measures obliging 
service providers to expeditiously preserve and disclose a sufficient amount of 
traffic data to identify service providers and the path which transmitted the 
communication.639 
 
• Production order: measures empowering authorities to order a person within the 
territory to submit specified computer data in that person’s possession, stored in a 
computer system, or a computer-data storage medium; or a service provider to 
submit subscriber information.640 
 
• Search and seizure of stored computer data: measures empowering authorities to 
search and seize stored computer data.641 
 
• Real-time collection of traffic data: measures empowering authorities to collect or 
record real-time traffic data for specified communications transmitted by a 
computer system.642 
 
• Interception of content data: measures empowering authorities to collect and 
record real time data for serious offences associated with specified 
communications transmitted by a computer system.643 
 
• Jurisdiction: measures establishing jurisdiction over cybercrimes committed: 
o within the territory; 
o on board a ship flying the State’s flag; 
o on board an aircraft registered under the State’s law; or 
                                               
638
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 16. 
639
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 17. 
640
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 18. 
641
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 19. Lesotho can do this in the same manner as with traditional 
tangibles. See also Schjolberg (note 56) 16. 
642
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 20. 
643
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 21. 
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o by any national, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was 
committed or if the offence is committed outside the State’s territorial 
jurisdiction. 
 
Except for offences committed in the territory, Lesotho may not apply these 
jurisdiction rules, or may apply them only in specific cases or conditions.644 
Additionally, Lesotho must establish measures to prosecute an alleged offender in 
the territory if not extraditing the person to another State, solely on the person’s 
nationality, after requesting extradition.645 Furthermore, when more than one State 
claims jurisdiction for a cybercrime offence, where appropriate, Lesotho could 
consult with other States to determine the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.646 
 
1.3 Mutual legal assistance agreements 
 
Lesotho must establish a rapid and effective system for international cooperation for 
the ‘smooth and rapid flow of information and evidence internationally.’647 Lesotho 
can establish this system by adopting the principles relating to mutual legal assistance 
efforts for countries to trace cybercriminals in cyberspace. These include: 
 
• Extradition 
• Voluntarily disclosing information 
• Confidentiality and the limitations on using shared information 
• Communications between central authorities 
• Requests for preserving, accessing and disclosing stored data 
• Interception of data 
• Trans-border access to stored computer data, 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-
week648 
                                               
644
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 22(2). 
645
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 22(3). This is based upon the principle of nationality, which 
provides that nationals of a State are obliged to comply with the domestic law even when they are 
outside its territory. See also the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 236. 
646
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 22(5). 
647
 See the Explanatory Report (note 221) para 242. 
648
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 23-35. 
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2. Conclusion 
 
Aided by the various international and supranational efforts on cybercrime and some 
national approaches on cybercrime, this chapter illustrates how Lesotho can legislate 
to curb cybercrime. However, Lesotho cannot fight cybercrime within the framework 
of domestic legislation alone. Actually, little consensus exists among nations on 
exactly what constitutes cybercrime.649 Different States have different approaches and 
different legal systems, standards and rules; therefore, harmonisation would be 
complicated. Some States might even opt out of the system and pose ‘as offshore 
havens’ for cybercrime.650 Indisputably, in the networked world, ‘no island is an 
island’; unless jurisdictions define crimes similarly, coordinated efforts by the law 
enforcement agencies to fight cybercrime will almost certainly fail.651 Consequently, 
all States must make a determined effort to identify the shortcomings of their own 
current laws, and draft and adopt a comprehensive cybercrime law. Indeed, various 
bodies active in combating cybercrime share a common theme, namely, the need for 
States to have consistent adequate laws defining the basic cybercrime offences and 
standardising the procedures governing investigations.652 
 
 
                                               
649
 See Figure 1 Chap three above. Also, countries used in Chap three have shown varied definitions. 
650
 See Gelbstein (note 72) 85. 
651
 See McConnell International note 1. 
652
 These bodies include the OECD, the COE, the UN, the EU and the G-8. See generally Chap two 
above. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Overview 
 
Cybercrime presents a problem that Lesotho has never before had to address, and to 
meet this challenge Lesotho has to review her domestic laws to determine if they are 
adequate to combat this ‘new’ crime. However, legislation alone cannot protect 
Lesotho against cybercrime. For laws to work properly, law enforcement must be 
capable of implementing the law. Additionally, private citizens must take reasonable 
steps to protect themselves. Certainly, as the McConnell International study notes: 
 
[i]f home owners failed to buy locks for their front doors, should towns solve the problem by 
passing more laws or hiring more police? Even where laws are adequate, firms dependent on 
the network must make their own information and systems secure. And where enforceable 
laws are months or years away, as in most countries, this responsibility is even more 
significant.653 
 
Thus, Lesotho must educate law enforcement agencies, implement measures to 
alleviate this problem, and police the Internet to detect cybercrime violations. 
Therefore, this chapter concludes that indeed cybercrime is a ‘beast,’ a serious 
problem that needs serious attention.  This study also concludes that Lesotho must 
educate her people about cybercrime, implement protective measures against this 
crime, and police the Internet. 
 
1. The nature of the ‘beast’ 
 
Undeniably, cybercrime poses a serious threat to the security of systems and 
networks, resulting in serious security and/or financial implications.  It is committed 
subtly and sophisticatedly, and has become a ‘weapon of choice’, mostly among white 
                                               
653
 McConnell International note 1. 
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collar criminals.654 Also, it poses serious threats to the health and safety of citizens, 
particularly children affected by child pornography.655 
 
Countless other activities may seriously affect the security of systems and 
emerge as a threat to Lesotho’s security.656 For instance, espionage or disinformation 
can be disruptive enough to instil fear and critical loss of confidence in the 
Government.657 As a result, to suit her own purposes, Lesotho can decide on what 
other conduct constitutes cybercrime (the list of offences in the model law is open-
ended). 
 
Largely, the Convention on Cybercrime has shaped the model law for 
cybercrime legislation for Lesotho. Although Lesotho is not a member, fully 
associating with the Convention would be a step in the right direction with regard to 
combating cybercrime. Further, Lesotho would better prepare for the Convention by 
incorporating it into her own legislation, thus addressing her domestic issues before 
attempting the international. Meanwhile, Lesotho should consider signing and 
ratifying the Convention.658 
 
The nature of cybercrime necessitates that the parameters of the future law be 
developed and negotiated globally, for a global consensus.659 Previously, the United 
Nations negotiated and agreed upon the Law of the Seas; the same approach might 
answer the cybercrime problem.660 The Law of the Seas involved lengthy 
negotiations, but the end justified the means.661 Whilst still waiting, Lesotho must 
start: 
 
                                               
654
 See Baker (note 6) at 62. See also 1.1.2 Chap one above. 
655
 See the discussion of obscene material/pornography at 2.3.1 Chap one above. 
656
 See 2.4 Chap one above. 
657
 See the discussion of espionage at 2.3.3 and 2.4 Chap one above. 
658
 See the Convention (note 166) Art 37(1). The Convention welcomes all States to accede to it, 
additionally the United States urges all States to join the Convention, and so ultimately Lesotho will 
ratify it. See the U.S.Department of State note 237. 
659
 See Gelbstein (note 72) 85. 
660
 See ibid. The Law of the Seas defines all aspects of uses of the seas, including civilian, commercial 
and military navigation, continental shelves, island and archipelago states, the concept of the ‘high 
seas’, conservation and management of species living in the seas, the common heritage of mankind, 
governance and many other issues. See also Gelbstein ibid 6. 
661
 See ibid. The negotiations lasted almost a decade, but the consensus reached has withstood the test 
of time. 
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• Educating about cybercrime 
• Implementing protective measures 
• Policing the Internet 
 
1.1 Educating about cybercrime 
 
To investigate and protect society from cybercrime, Lesotho must train her law 
enforcement agencies in the use of computers; otherwise they will be powerless to 
act.662 For instance, if an investigating officer does not know what an e-mail is, or 
even that e-mail electronic records are kept and can be found, successfully 
prosecuting the case may be difficult.663 Lesotho must mandate investigating officers 
to have a basic level of computer literacy to be able to ask the basic questions about 
the crimes they will be investigating.664 Further, Lesotho must train patrol officers to 
recognise a cybercrime when occurring, and to appreciate calling in an expert to deal 
with the situation.665 Wrongly attending a cybercrime case may negatively affect 
preserving evidence, arresting the perpetrator, or successfully pursuing the 
prosecution of the case.666 Moreover, Lesotho must seriously consider ‘encouraging 
young, college-educated computer science majors to join the police force.’667 
Significantly, ‘although all officers will require basic literacy in information 
technology, some police personnel will require in-depth training in order to 
effectively police the digital world.’668 
 
Again, Lesotho must train presiding officers to handle cybercrime (and other 
related) cases. Presiding officers need to have exposure to computers; otherwise 
investigating officers’ attempts to pursue prosecutions will be frustrated. Sadly and 
generally, Lesotho’s members of the bench (especially the judges) are rather advanced 
                                               
662
 The G-8 recommends training law enforcement and equipping them to address high-tech crimes. 
See 5.1 Chap two above. 
663
 See Goodman (note 7) at 493. 
664
 See ibid at 492. 
665
 See ibid. 
666
 See ibid. 
667
 See ibid at 491. 
668
 Goodman (note 7) at 493. A person performing computer forensics must have more than technical 
knowledge, however, an understanding of performing the work legally is crucial; relatively, the work 
must be done in a way that preserves the value and admissibility of the evidence. See Steven M 
Abrams with Philip C Weis ‘Knowledge of computer forensics is becoming essential for attorneys in 
the information age’ in Pauline C Reich (ed) Cybercrime and Security (2005) 2. 
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in age and appreciating computing skills at that age may be difficult. However, 
Lesotho must find a way to address this issue. Likewise, Lesotho must train 
prosecuting authorities to effectively handle cybercrime. 
 
1.2 Implementing protective measures 
 
To help alleviate cybercrime problems, Lesotho must encourage the implementation 
of these protective measures: 
 
• To become aware of the problem: Educating the people about the dangers of 
cybercrime and giving it more publicity will best determine addressing the 
problem.669 
 
• To devise an information security strategy: Adopting reasonable steps for 
protecting the security of systems and networks will avoid being easily 
attacked.670 
 
• To implement quick simple remedial procedures: Timely implementation of 
simple solutions in set-ups (like firewalls, regularly changing passwords and the 
management of cookies), if not already built-in, will prevent security threats.671 
 
• To seek immediate professional help: Immediately engaging expert assistance to 
check loopholes in systems, regularly, particularly for large organisations and the 
government, will protect the security of systems.672 
 
• To adopt international and other best practices: Adopting international standards 
(like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines, 
                                               
669
 See the OECD Guidelines, 2002 note 183. See also the principle of ‘awareness’ at 2.1 Chap two 
above. The majority of the people does not know about cybercrime until it hits them. 
670
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principle of ‘responsibility’ ibid. See also 2.1 Chap two above. 
671
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principle of ‘response’ ibid. See also 2.1 Chap two above. 
672
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principles of ‘response,’ ‘risk assessment’ and ‘security design and 
implementation’ ibid. Critical infrastructures and key functions of government must engage external 
auditors for regular check-ups. See also 2.1 Chap two above. 
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the Group of Eight initiatives) and other best practices will assist in securing 
systems from external threats.673 
 
• To identify the gaps in national legislation: Working closely with the industry and 
individuals will improve their understanding of the law for a comprehensive 
approach to security management. This will assist in identifying gaps in the 
law.674 
 
• To urge the United Nations to embark on a Law of Cyberspace: Joining hands 
with other nations to urge the United Nations to embark on the Law of 
Cyberspace, as cybercrime poses a domestic threat that needs international 
cooperation to effectively address the problem.675 
 
1.3 Policing the Internet 
 
Lesotho must create special interest groups to address various information security 
aspects. These groups can function as ‘watchdogs’ 24-hours-a-day-seven-days-a-week 
and alert the government about security and other cybercrime violations. Also, they 
can be used to train others to ‘enhance response capabilities.’676 
 
2. Concluding remarks 
 
• Lesotho must work together with the industry toward the common goal of 
controlling cybercrime and making the Internet a safe place. 
 
• ‘By increasing ethical awareness and ethical behaviour in cyberspace and by 
introducing and evaluating the relevance and appropriateness of legislation’ 
                                               
673
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principles of ‘ethics’ and ‘democracy’ ibid. See also 2.1 Chap above. 
674
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principle of ‘security management’ ibid. See also 2.1 Chap two 
above. 
675
 See the OECD Guidelines, the principle of ‘reassessment’ note 185. See also 2.1 Chap two above. 
676
 See the G8 Principles for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures note 312. See also the 
discussion of the G-8 principles at 5.1 Chap two above. 
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Lesotho would avoid having her citizens resort to extreme measures for the 
security of their systems.677  
 
• By legislating on cybercrime Lesotho would be breaking new ground in the area 
of cybercrime as a small developing country in Africa specifically addressing 
spreading criminal activities in cyberspace. 
 
• Since cybercrime penetrates the whole world, all countries should adopt a model 
of law that will also penetrate all countries. Thus Lesotho must urge her fellow 
countries to adopt cybercrime legislation. 
 
• Indeed, the cybercrime war is fiercely raging, but the armoury is not far away, and 
will come soon to Lesotho if she adopts cybercrime legislation. 
 
• Cybercrime is a true ‘beast’, a menace to society that Lesotho has to address to 
enjoy the benefits of the electronic age.  Otherwise, her citizens will be 
unnecessarily vulnerable to cybercriminals. 
 
• To strike a balance between guaranteeing citizens their rights and combating 
cybercrime, Lesotho must enact this law within the parameters of the Constitution 
and the fundamental national commitment to protecting human rights and 
freedoms. 
 
• Cybercrime is already a difficult concept, with complex terminology. Therefore, 
in drafting the law, Lesotho must use simple words and prefer using the active 
verb rather than the passive, for clarity and accessibility.678 Additionally, Lesotho 
must clearly define all the elements of the offences and the use of terms. 
                                               
677
 See D P van der Merwe L Pretorious and A Barnard ‘Cyberethics and the South African Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act.’ Available at 
http://www.ccsr.cse.dmu.ac.uk/conferences/ethicomp/ethicomp2004/abstracts/12.html [Accessed 20 
October 2006]. 
678
 The drafting personnel must avoid complicating the language by unnecessarily using legal phrases 
and difficult words. The law has been made difficult by such approach, yet the law must be kept simple 
and accessible, clearly speaking to the people. Mostly, when people understand and appreciate the law 
they are more likely to abide by it. 
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Furthermore, Lesotho must have this law in one piece of legislation for easy 
reference and to avoid confusion.679 
 
• Finally, considering that this area of law is a new concept, in drafting this law 
Lesotho will need an expert in Electronic Law, particularly on cybercrime related 
issues, and I will always be a mouse click away.680 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
679
 Newly created offences, amended traditional offences, ancillary liability, procedural law, and 
mutual assistance agreements must all be contained in one statute. 
680
 I will be happy to oblige Lesotho by offering my skills and I will be sure to leave my contacts with 
the Minister of Law and Constitutional Affairs himself. 
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